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INTRODUCTION

Equal protection cases routinely distinguish between "suspect" and
"nonsuspect" classifications. Because "nonsuspect" classifications are
scrutinized under the forgiving "rational basis" test, government
regulations of economic activity are usually upheld even in highly
questionable circumstances.
But several recent decisions in federal
courts-involving enterprises as diverse as barber shops and shoe
shining-suggest a need to reexamine Twentieth Century assumptions
about equal rights.
In this article, I argue that the values protected by the Equal Protection
Clause require a more meaningful judicial review of economic regulations.
In Part I, I reexamine the history of our Constitution's concept of equality,
showing how it is inextricably linked with the right of each American to
pursue happiness by earning a living in a lawful occupation. In Part II, I
address the many ways that anti-competitive regulations have been used to
violate the Equal Protection Clause, especially (though not exclusively) in
the context of America's historical conflicts between the races. Part III
describes the recent rise of more meaningful rationality review in a number
of recent federal decisions, and Part IV shows how economic exclusion has
routinely been held unconstitutional under several different Constitutional
provisions. Part V describes recent court cases which have stopped
economically favored groups, from barbers to shoe shiners
to funeral directors, from getting rich by making it illegal to compete with
them. Part VI describes how courts should apply a meaningful rationality
review to economic regulations. Finally, Part VII addresses why critics of
meaningful scrutiny in cases involving economic regulations are not
convincing.
When groups use government's regulatory power to insulate
themselves from competition and prevent entrepreneurs from earning a
living, it threatens not only the right to pursue happiness, but the
fundamental principles of equality, as well.
I.

EQUALITY AND ECONOMIC FREEDOM

The principle of equality enshrined in the Declaration of
Independence has its roots in the writings of John Locke,3 who explained

2.
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, I Stat. I (U.S. 1776).
3. Thomas Jefferson explained years afterward that the Declaration had not been
intended "to find our new principles, or new arguments, never before thought of," but that
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in his Second Treatise of Civil Government that "the Equality I there spoke
of' was "that equal Right that every Man hath, to his Natural Freedom,
without being subjected to the Will or Authority of any other Man." 4 All
people, America's founders said, were entitled to liberty: that is, to a
certain sphere of self-rule, in which they were free to run their lives without
interference from others. 5
The principle of liberty meant that each person was free to act unless
valid reasons dictated otherwise; the burden of justification rested, not on
the party proposing to act, but on the ?arty proposing to stop another from
acting.6 This presumption of freedom relieved individuals of the onerous,
if not impossible,8 burden of justifying their conduct before acting, and it
also opened society in general to social innovation and experiment, with its
resulting advances in technology and the standard of living. 9 The principle
of equality meant that those others who asserted a right to stop others from
acting had to justify it on the basis of some principle relevant to the activity
involved, rather than on the basis of such factors as their popularity, or
favoritism. The freedom to act could not be arbitrarilydenied. These two
themes of liberty and equality were therefore closely related.'l As John
Adams wrote in the Massachusetts Constitution,
No man, nor corporation, or association of men, have any
other title to obtain advantages, or particular and exclusive
privileges, distinct from those of the community, than what
arises from the consideration of services rendered to the
public; and this title being in nature neither hereditary, nor
"its authority rests then on the harmonizing sentiments of the day, whether expressed in
conversation, in letters, printed essays, or in the elementary books of public right, as
Aristotle, Cicero, Locke, Sidney, &c." Letter to Henry Lee, May 8, 1825 in JEFFERSON:
WRITINGS 1500, 1501 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1984).
4.
JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 346 (Peter Laslettrev. ed.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1963) (1690).
5.

See generally THOMAS WEST, VINDICATING THE FOUNDERS: RACE, SEX, CLASS,

AND JUSTICE IN THE ORIGINS OF AMERICA

1-36 (1997). West discusses at length the most

glaring violation of this principle, slavery.
6.
See ANTHONY DE JASAY, JUSTICE

AND ITS SURROUNDINGS

150-151 (2002).

7.

Cf. Randy E. Barnett, Necessary and Proper, in THE SUPREME COURT AND

9.
10.

See infra, Part VI. c.
For a deeper treatment of the connection, see Harry V. Jaffa, Equality As A

AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM, 167, 188-194 (B. Wilson & K. Masugi eds.,1998). See
also WILLIAM T. LETWIN, ECONOMIC DUE PROCESS IN THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION AND
THE RULE OF LAW (1979).
8.
See JASAY, supra note 6, at 150.

Conservative Principle,reprinted in How To THINK ABOUT THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 13

(1978).
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transmissible to children, or descendants, or relations by
blood, the idea of a man born a magistrate, lawgiver, or
judge, is absurd and unnatural."
One of the most important aspects of the regime of individual freedom
that Adams' generation created was the principle that each person had the
right to earn a living for himself and his family. 12 This was little more than
a reassertion of the principle that a person had the right to act unless some
vital public reason overrode that right. Seventeenth Century English
decisions had laid the legal groundwork for asserting this principle in the
American revolutionary era; for instance, in The Case of the Tailors, Sir
Edward Coke wrote that
at the common law, no man could be prohibited from
working in any lawful trade, for the law abhors idleness,
the mother of all evil, otium omnium vitiorum mater, and
especially in young men, who ought in their youth, (which
is their seed time) to learn lawful sciences and trades,
which are profitable to the commonwealth, and whereof
they might reap the fruit in their old age, for idle in youth,
poor in age; and therefore the common law abhors all
monopolies, which prohibit any from working in any
lawful trade.... 13
Note that Coke's primary concern was not with protecting the
wealthy, but with protecting the poor against the political favoritism of the
wealthy and politically powerful. He explained that "the monopolizer
engrosseth to himself what should be free for all men,"' 14 by using
government to create barriers to entry in the marketplace. Such barriers
made it harder-or illegal-for entrepreneurs to compete fairly. The crown
might grant, for instance, an exclusive right to buy and sell playing cards,
making it illegal for others to do so.' 5 This meant that those who might
have earned an honest living by making and selling playing cards were not

11.

12.
(2003).
13.
14.

MASS. CONST. art VI.

See

Timothy Sandefur, The Right to Earn A Living, 6 CHAP. L. REV. 207

The Case of the Tailors, &c. of Ipswich, 77 Eng. Rep. 1218, 1219 (1615).
CATHERINE DRINKER BOWEN, THE LION AND THE THRONE: THE LIFE AND TIMES

OF EDWARD COKE 420 (1957).

15.

See Darcy v. Allen, 77 Eng. Rep 1260 (K.B. 1602).
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allowed to, and instead had to seek another job, or be reduced to poverty.
As Coke explained,
if a graunt be made to any man, to have the sole making of
cards, or the sole dealing with any other trade, that graunt
is against the liberty and freedome of the subject, that
before did, or lawfully might have used that trade, and
consequently against this great charter [Magna Charta].
Generally all monopolies are against this great charter,
because they are against the liberty and freedome of the
subject, and against the law of the land. 16
Monopolies were a form of subsidy, 7 and by paying off supporters of
the crown with exclusive trading privileges, the crown could buy loyalty.
Recipients of royal monopolies, however, frequently defended themselves
by claiming that they were simply protecting the public. In some cases,
that argument was reasonable-the law protected consumers by limiting
the practice of certain trades, just as it today protects the public by
requiring licenses for doctors. But in many other cases, that claim was
simply a pretext. As Coke put it, those seeking legal protection against
competition are frequently like a man rowing a boat: "they' 8look one way,
and row another: they pretend public profit, intend private."'
By claiming that they were protecting the public against shoddy
merchandise, or untrained practitioners, or against other evils, tradesmen
might contrive to prevent fair competition in the market. Some of these
legal protections were quite extreme, as Adam Smith described in 1776:
Our woollen manufacturers have been more successful
than any other class of workmen, in persuading the
legislature that the prosperity of the nation depended upon
the success and extension of their particular business....
[T]he cruellest of our revenue laws, I will venture to
affirm, are mild and gentle, in comparison of some of those

16.
17.

2 EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES 47.
See Richard A. Epstein, The Necessary History of Property And Liberty, 6

18.

R.H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW 196 (1988) (spelling

CHAP. L. REV. 1, 20 (2003) ("Any barrier to trade, whether in the form of a tax, permit, or
regulation, imposed on an outsider, is a form of economic protection for the insiders, just as
the restrictions struck down in Jacobs and Lochner were understood to be anticompetitive
'labor' statutes.").
modernized).
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which the clamor of our merchants and manufacturers had
extorted from the legislature, for the support of their own
absurd and oppressive monopolies.... By [one law], the
exporter of sheep, lambs, or rams, was for the first offence
to forfeit all his goods for ever, to suffer a year's
imprisonment, and then to have his left hand cut off in a
merket town upon a market day, to be there nailed up; and
for the second offence to be adjudged a felon, and to suffer
death accordingly. 19
Although Smith noted that there was no reported case of this sentence
being carried out, it nevertheless demonstrated the absurdity of laws
designed to protect the economic advantages of politically powerful
groups.
The wool-makers had "justif[ied] their demand of such
extraordinary restrictions and regulations" on the ground that English wool
"was of a peculiar quality, superior to that of any other country," and that
"fine cloth could not be made without it."' 20 But this was "perfectly
false.",21 Rather, the anti-export laws were devised merely to enrich the
makers of wool at the expense not only of their customers-who were
made to pay more due to the decrease in supply-but also potential
competitors. And this, Smith wrote, violated principles of equality. "To
hurt in any degree the interest of any one order of citizens, for no other
purpose but to promote that of some other, is evidently contrary to that
justice and equality of treatment which the sovereign owes to all the
different orders of his subjects. 2 2
23
Monopolies were a prime target of the eighteenth century Whigs,
and this anti-monopoly philosophy served as one of the primary concerns
of American political theory.24 That hostility to monopolies was one of the

19.

ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF

20.
21.
22.

Id. at 651.
Id.
Id. at 654 (emphasis added).

NATIONS 647-648 (Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1976) (1776).

23.

See Michael Conant, Antimonopoly Tradition under The Ninth And Fourteenth

Amendments: Slaughter-House Cases Re-Examined, 31 EMORY L.J. 785 (1982).
24.
See William Letwin, Congress And The Sherman Antitrust Law: 1887-1890, 23
U. CHI. L. REV. 221, 226 (1956) ("Hatred of monopoly is one of the oldest American
political habits ....
");Gary Minda, The Common Law, Labor And Antitrust, II INDUS. REL.
L.J. 461 (1989) ("The early common law of contracts in restraint of trade developed from
early decisions of the English courts in their effort to protect individual rights from the
excessive regulations of the mercantilist state." Id. at 474).
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fundamental principles of the Jeffersonian political philosophy.25 The "first
principle of association," said Jefferson, was "the guarantee to every one of
a free exercise of his industry, and the fruits acquired by it."' 26 Thus "every
one has a natural right to choose for his pursuit such one of them as he
thinks most likely to furnish him subsistence., 27 The right to earn a living
was, indeed, the very essence of the pursuit of happiness, 28 a right that
ought to be equally protected for all. Wrote James Madison,
That is not a just government, nor is property secure under
it, where arbitrary
restrictions,
exemptions,
and
monopolies deny to part of its citizens that free use of their
faculties, and free choice of their occupations, which not
only constitute their property in the general sense of the
word; but are the means of acquiring property strictly so
called. What must be the spirit of legislation where a
manufacturer of linen cloth is forbidden to bury his own
child in a linen shroud, in order to favour his neighbour
who manufactures woolen cloth; where the manufacturer
and wearer of woolen cloth are again forbidden the
oeconomical use of buttons of that material, in favor of the
manufacturer of buttons of other materials !29
For the politically powerful to use their influence to block fair
competition interfered with the pursuit of what we today call "the
American dream"-and allowed some to succeed at the expense of others,
essentially taxing others for their own private benefit. As Adams' and
Madison's words make clear, the framers considered this a form of theft.
But equality means that no person has a fundamental right to exploit
another's wealth through the apparatus of govemment,3 ° just as they have

25.
See Conant, supra note 23, at 792-801. See also Timothy Sandefur, Liberal
Originalism: A Past for The Future, 27 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y (forthcoming 2004)
(noting Declaration of Independence's connections to economic liberty).
26.
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Joseph Milligan (Apr. 6, 1816), in 14
WRITINGS OFTHOMAS JEFFERSON 456, 466 (Albert Ellery Bergh ed., 1907).
27.
Thoughts on Lotteries, (Feb. 1826), in 17 WRINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON.
448, 449 (Albert Ellery Bergh ed., 1907).
28.
Sandefur, Right to Earn A Living, supra note 12, at 219-221; WEST, supra note
5, at 43-53. Cf The Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 104-05 (1872) (Field, J.,
dissenting).
29.
James Madison, Property, reprinted in JAMES MADISON: WRITINGS 515, 516
(Jack N. Rakove ed., 1999).
30.
This view was routinely expressed as the "No A to B" doctrine, particularly in
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no right to force others to work for them. Monopolies 3 1 violate this
principle by enabling those superior only in wealth and political power to
prevail at the expense of those who were superior in talent and
perseverance 32 Indeed, because monopolies allow insiders to enrich
themselves at the expense of outsiders, they are what Abraham Lincoln
called
the same old serpent that says you work and I eat, you toil
and I will enjoy the fruits of it. Turn i[t] whatever way you
will-whether it come from the mouth of a King, an
excuse for enslaving the people of his country, or from the
mouth of men of one race as a reason for enslaving the
men of another race, it is all the same old serpent .... 33

cases involving the power of eminent domain. See Timothy Sandefur, A Natural Rights
View of Eminent Domain in California: A Rationale for Meaningful Judicial Scrutiny of
"Public Use," 32 Sw. U. L. REv. 569, 590-93 (2003). It is also found in nineteenth century
cases involving government's power to participate in the market, for instance in buying
railroad bonds. See id. at 624-32; Loan Association v. Topeka, 20 Wall. (87 U.S.) 655
(1874).
31.
The term "monopoly" has obviously come to mean something quite different.
See Sandefur, Right to Earn a Living, supra note 12, at 218-219. This change came during
the nineteenth century, when increasing entanglement between government and private
industry-particularly in the case of railroads-spurred popular outrage at corporate
privilege. See Letwin, supra note 24, at 233-235. The Sherman Anti-Trust Act thus aimed
at protecting small businesses against "unlawful combinations. It does not in the least affect
combinations in aid of production where there is free and fair competition. It is the right of
every man to work, labor, and produce in any lawful vocation and to transport his
production on equal terms and conditions and under like circumstances. This is industrial
liberty, and lies at the foundation of the equality of all rights and privileges." 21 CONG.
REc. 2457 (1890) (statement of Sen. Sherman), quoted in W.W. THORNTON, COMBINATIONS
INRESTRAINT OFTRADE 10-11 (2d ed. 1928).
32.
See Richard Bland, An Inquiry into The Rights of The British Colonies (1766),
reprintedin I AMERICAN POLITICAL WRITING DURING THE FOUNDING ERA 67, 82 (Charles S.
Hyneman & Donald S. Lutz eds., 1983) ("[British] Acts, which imposed severer
Restrictions upon the Trade of the colonies than were imposed upon the Trade of England,
deprived the Colonies, so far as these Restrictions extended, of the Privileges of English
Subjects, and constituted an unnatural Difference between Men under the same Allegiance,
born equally free, and entitled to the same civil Rights.").
33.
Abraham Lincoln, Speech at Chicago, I11.(July 10, 1858), reprinted in 2
COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 500 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953). See also
Sandefur, "Public Use, " supra note 30, at 579-83. As this passage from Lincoln makes
clear, the obvious exception to all of the framers' talk of the right to earn a living was
slavery. Many of the framers were themselves quite candid in acknowledging this
inconsistency. See WEST, supra note 5, at 14-19. The abolitionists, of course, were even
more explicit. As Charles Sumner told the Senate, the "ever-present motive power," of
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The framers believed that governments' power to tax or regulate could
only be used to provide public goods, in which all of society benefited; but
for government to tax or regulate, or create other legal obstacles, which did
not benefit the public, but merely benefited private interests, violated the
principle of equality.34 As Madison put it, the "first object of government"
was to protect people's "different and unequal faculties of acquiring
property"-namely, their unique talents and hard work. 35 By freeing
individuals to achieve what they could through their own dedication and
invention, American society would nourish what Jefferson called the
"natural aristocracy" of "virtue and talents," rather than the aristocracy of
birth and privilege.36 Near the end of the American Revolution, Benjamin
Franklin bragged to Europeans that in America, "people do not inquire
concerning a Stranger, What is he? but, What can he do?"
If he has any useful Art, he is welcome, and if he exercises
it, and behaves well, he will be respected by all that know
him; but a mere Man of Quality, who, on that Account,
wants to live upon the Public, by some Office or Salary,
will be despis'd and disregarded. The Husbandman is in
honor [in America], and even the Mechanic, because their
Employments

are

useful

.

.

.

.

With

regard

to

Encouragements for Strangers from Government, they are
really only what are derived from good Laws and Liberty.

slavery was "simply to compel the labor offellow-men without wages!" CONG. GLOBE, 36th

Cong., 1st Sess. 2592 (1860).
34.
See Bland, supra note 32, at 83.
Rights imply Equality in the Instances to which they belong, and must
be treated without Respect to the Dignity of the Persons concerned in
them ....
Why is the Trade of the Colonies more circumscribed than
the Trade of Britain? And why are Impositions laid upon the one which
are not laid upon the other? If the Parliament 'have a Right to impose
Taxes of every Kind upon the Colonies,' they ought in Justice, as the
same People, to have the same Sources to raise them from: Their
Commerce ought to be equally free with the Commerce of Britain ....
Id. at 83.
35.

THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison). See also Property,supra note 29, at

515 ("that alone is a just government, which impartially secures to every man, whatever is
his own.").
36.
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Adams (Oct. 28, 1813), in THE ADAMSJEFFERSON LETTERS 387, 388 (Lester J. Cappon ed., 1959). See Sandefur, Right to Earn A

Living, supra note 12, at 220. See also Thomas Gordon, Cato's Letters No. 45 (Sept. 16,
1721), reprinted in 1 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 511, 512 (Phillip B. Kurland & Ralph
Lerner eds., 1987) ("There is nothing moral in Blood, or in Title, or in Place: Actions only,
and the Causes that produce them, are moral. He therefore is best that does best.").
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... [T]he Laws protect them sufficiently, so that they have
no need of the Patronage of Great Men; and every one will
enjoy securely the Profits of his Industry. But if he does
not bring a Fortune with him, he must work and be
industrious to live ....
In short, America is the Land of
Labour .... 37

Freedom of labor in early America was largely ensured by the fact
that, unlike England, there was no guild system. Although there were still
apprentices and indentured servants, new practitioners of various trades
were not required to be licensed by a guild before embarking on their own
39
business. 38 And while courts could enforce apprenticeship agreements which were essentially covenants not to compete-the isolation and
distance between American towns, and the vast forests of early America,
made it much easier for apprentices to run away.4' These, and other
factors-including the absence of a large regulatory bureaucracy in early
America-created a society in which entrepreneurs could start a new
business or an untried idea and try their hands at what came to be called the
"American dream." The result was a massive shift in the way people lived
their lives, a vast rise in the material standard of living of even the poorest
Americans and a freedom of opportunity which, while it certainly had its
drawbacks, was an indescribable improvement over the static lives to
which their ancestors had been condemned.
II.

ECONOMIC EXCLUSION

The dangers of monopoly might be gauged from the way it has
frequently been used in America as a weapon against racial minorities or

37.
Benjamin Franklin, Information to Those Who Would Remove to America, Sept.
1782, reprintedin 1 KURLAND & LERNER, supra note 36, at 532.
38.
See e.g., Robinson v. Groscourt, 87 Eng. Rep. 547 (1695).
39.
See, e.g., James v. Le Roy, 6 Johns. 274 (N.Y. Sup. 1810); Easby v. Fletcher, 8
F. Cas. 264 (C.C.D.C. 1841).
40.
See Bricheno v. Thorp, 37 Eng. Rep. 864, 865 (1821) ("A gentleman going into
business for himself must not carry into it the secrets of his master; but on the other hand, I
think it is my duty to take care that he may not be prevented from engaging in any business
that he may fairly and honorably take.").
41.
See Rainer Winkelmann, Book Review, 55 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 751, 751
(2002) ("The 'runaway' apprentice clearly was a recurring concern through history. This is
one explanation for why the apprenticeship system never really gained ground in the United
States.").
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other politically unpopular groups. 42
At the end of the Civil War,
occupational licensing became a key tool of preventing former slaves from
earning a living in competition with whites.4 3 As David E. Bernstein has
repeatedly shown, "white interest groups used occupational licensing laws
to stifle black economic progress. While generally not Jim Crow laws per
se, the laws were used both in the South and the North to prevent blacks
from competing with established white skilled workers." 44 For instance,
although some 20 percent of American barbers in the 1890s were black,
that number had dropped to about 11 percent thirty years later.45 This was
largely the result of licensing laws and other regulations that required
barbers to go through expensive and time-consuming training, or to serve
only customers of their own race. 46 These laws imposed an enormous
burden on blacks, particularly because they generally had less access to
legal representation and were therefore less able to protect themselves in
the courts.4 7

42.
See Timothy Sandefur, Can You Get Therefrom Here?: How Government Still
Threatens King's Dream, 22 J.L. & INEQUALITY 1 (2004).

43.

It was, of course, hardly the only tool. See, e.g., David E. Bernstein, The Law

and Economics of Post-Civil War Restrictions on Interstate Migration by AfricanAmericans, 76 TEX. L. REV. 781 (1998). Another example was laws passed by southern
states shortly after the end of the Civil War, which made it a criminal offense to break a
labor contract. See Aziz Z. Huq, Note, Peonage And ContractualLiberty, 101 COLUM. L.
REV. 351 (2001). These "peonage laws" were struck down by the Supreme Court in the
early years of the twentieth century. See Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., Principle And Prejudice:
The Supreme Court and Race in The Progressive Era, Part 2 The Peonage Cases, 82
COLUM. L. REV. 646 (1982).
44.
David E. Bernstein, Licensing Laws: A Historical Example of the Use Of
Government Regulatory Power Against African-Americans, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 89, 90
(1994). See also David E. Bernstein, Lochner, Parity, and the Chinese Laundry Cases, 41
WM. & MARY L. REV. 211 (1999); David E. Bernstein, Roots of The 'Underclass': The
Decline of Laissez-Faire Jurisprudence and the Rise of Racist Labor Legislation, 43 AM.
U.L. REV. 85 (1993);

DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, ONLY ONE PLACE OF REDRESS: AFRICAN
AMERICANS, LABOR REGULATIONS, AND THE COURTS FROM RECONSTRUCTION TO THE NEW

DEAL (200 1).
45.
Bernstein, Licensing Laws, supra note 44, at 99.
46.
Id.
47.
Jack Greenberg reports in his memoir, CRUSADERS IN THE COURTS: HOW A
DEDICATED BAND OF LAWYERS FOUGHT THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION (1994), that, as an
attorney leading the crusade against segregated schools, Thurgood Marshall held off
challenging these discriminatory ordinances in order to focus his full attention on public
education. But Marshall recognized the burden of occupational licensing laws. See, e.g.,
Thurgood Marshall, The Supreme Court as Protector of Civil Rights: Equal Protection of
the Laws, reprinted in THURGOOD MARSHALL: His SPEECHES, WRITINGS, ARGUMENTS,
OPINIONS, AND REMINISCENCES 116, 119-20 (M. Tushnet ed., 2001).
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Although such discriminatory monopolies were usually justified under
the pretext of protecting the public against low-quality goods and services,
proponents were often quite frank about their desire to use the law to close
out competition by members of disfavored races. For instance, in 1931,
Congress passed a bill intended to prevent black contractors from "taking
jobs" from white labor. 48 The law, which came to be known as the DavisBacon Act, 49 requires contractors performing work for the federal
government to pay employees a "prevailing wage" as determined by the
Department of Labor. Because black contractors performed mostly
unskilled manual labor, their major competitive advantage lay in their
ability to charge low prices to employers. But the Davis-Bacon Act set a
price floor, making it illegal to charge below a certain rate, depriving black
laborers of that bargaining tool, and insulating white labor unions against
their major source of competition.5 ° Complaining that "[c]olored labor is
being brought in to demoralize wage rates," 5' and that the "real problem
you are confronted with" in the south was "a superabundance or large
aggregation of negro labor," 52 proponents of the Act sought to exclude
black workers by making it more expensive to hire them. The Act, which
remains on the statute books,53 is but one instance of a historical conflict
between black labor and predominantly white unions.54

48.

See David E. Bernstein, The Davis-Bacon Act: Let's Bring Jim Crow to an End,

Cato Institute Briefing
Paper No.
17, (Jan.
18,
1993), available at
http://www.cato.org/pubs/briefs/bp-017es.html (last visited Apr. 16, 2003); Institute for

Justice, Removing Barriers to Opportunity: A ConstitutionalChallenge to the Davis-Bacon
Act, available at http://www.ij.org/cases/economic/davisbk.shtml (last visited Apr. 16,
2003); David E. Bernstein, The Davis-Bacon Act: Vestige of Jim Crow, 13 NAT'L BLACK
L.J. 276

(1994);

CLINT

BOLICK, TRANSFORMATION:

THE POWER

AND

POLITICS OF

EMPOWERMENT 84-88 (1998).

49.

40 U.S.C. § 3141-48 (2002).

50.
See Bernstein, Vestige, supra note 48, at 288. See also David E. Bernstein, The
Shameful, Wasteful History of New York's Prevailing Wage Law, 7 GEO. MASON U. CIV.
RTS. L.J. 1 (1997).

51.
Bernstein, Vestige, supra note 48, at 285-86.
52.
Id. at 282.
53.
In 1993, a lawsuit was filed challenging the Act on equal protection grounds.
But that lawsuit, Brazier Construction Co., et al. v. Robert Reich, et al., No. 93-2318
(D.D.C.), remains unresolved. For further information, see Institute for Justice: Legal

Cases, Removing Barriersto Opportunity: A Constitutional Challenge to The Davis-Bacon
Act, available at http://www.ij.org/cases/economic/davis.shtml.

54.
This conflict goes back to the end of the Civil War. The former slave Frederick
Douglass was even moved to denounce labor unions for excluding blacks: the black laborer,
he wrote, "is made a transgressor for working at a low rate of wages by the very men who
prevented his getting a high rate." Quoted in WALDO E. MARTIN, JR., THE MIND OF

FREDERICK DOUGLASS 101-02 (1984).

Nor were the professions immune. The American

Bar Association and the American Medical Association both went through periods of
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Another example is the treatment of Chinese immigrants in nineteenth
century California. The primary motivation for the era's virulent antiChinese sentiment was economic: Chinese immigrants, who worked in the
gold fields and then performed back-breaking labor building the
Transcontinental Railroad, were powerful economic competition to
American natives and European immigrants. They took difficult and
dangerous jobs for low wages; the cruel discrimination they faced was, as
one railroad worker later recalled, "not for their vices but for their virtues.
No one would hire an Irishman, German, Englishman, or Italian when he
could get a Chinese, because our countrymen are so much more honest,
industrious, steady, sober, and painstaking. 55 The Chinese were therefore
a prime target, not just because of their cultural differences, but for
economic reasons. "I am willing to go as far as any gentleman on this
floor," said one delegate to the California Constitutional Convention of
1878,
by way of police, sanitary, criminal, or vagrant regulations,
or refusing to license this class of aliens to carry on any
trade or business whatever, if we can in any way, by statute
or otherwise, prevent the same. And I would go further
and continue to hamper them in every way that human
ingenuity could invent, so that the 'heathen Chinee'
himself would see that it was getting too hot for him to
attempt to try to make a living here, and would
consequently leave for his own or some other more genial
climate for him at least .... Look at our cities again in
another and mor humiliating aspect either by gas or
daylight.., you see scores and hundreds of once beautiful,
lovely, and virtuous females who have been driven to the
vilest sinks of iniquity, and lowest grade of female
degradation, and shame, all for the want of the opportunity
of making an honest living in the numerous vocations that
in every direction usurping and
these Chinese hordes are
56
taking away from them!

seeking to exclude black lawyers and doctors, respectively. See Pamela A. McManus, Have
Law License, Will Travel, 15 GEO. J.LEGAL ETHICS 527, 536-37 (2002).
55.
56.

STEPHEN A. AMBROSE, NOTHING LIKE IT IN THE WORLD 153 (2000).
E.B. WILLIS & P.K. STOCKTON, DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS

OF

THE

CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 727 (1878) (Remarks of Mr.
Thompson).
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Chinese workers were subjected to burdensome special taxes, for the
privilege of mining, or for schools (which they were not allowed to attend),
or for water. If the Chinese worker could not pay, he was liable to be
beaten to death, or sent to prison, where one spiteful state law required that
their long braided queues-which the Chinese prized-be cut off.58 Mark
Twain even turned his sharp sarcastic pen on anti-Chinese discrimination,
noting that,
the great commonwealth of California imposes an unlawful
mining-tax on John the [Chinese] foreigner, and allows
Patrick the [Irish] foreigner to dig for nothing-probably
because the degraded Mongol is at no expense for whisky,
and the refined Celt cannot exist without it . . . [A]
respectable number of the tax-gatherers-it would be
unkind to say all of them-collect the tax twice, instead of
once ... solely to discourage Chinese immigration to the
mines . . . a thing that is much applauded, and likewise
regarded as being singularly facetious.59
Eight years after Twain wrote these words, California's second
Constitutional Convention produced a Constitution that prohibited any
corporation from employing the Chinese, and forbade them from owning
property. 60
Shortly after the ratification of the new Constitution, the Legislature
passed laws which, among other things, prohibited the Chinese from
fishing in California's waters, and barred the state, or any local
government, from issuing business licenses to "aliens not eligible to
become electors of the state of California," a euphemism for the Chinese.6 1
This law, and the Constitutional provisions behind it, were struck down by
federal courts shortly thereafter.62 These laws, the court held, were

57.
58.
59.

See AMBROSE, supra note 55, at 150.

See Ho Ah Kow v. Nunan, 12 F. Cas. 252, 254 (C.C.D. Ca. 1879).
Mark Twain, Disgraceful Persecution of A Boy (1870), reprinted in THE
COMPLETE ESSAYS OF MARK TWAIN 7 (C. Neider, ed., New York: Da Capo, 2000) (1963).
60.
See CARL BRENT SWISHER, MOTIVATION AND POLITICAL TECHNIQUE AT THE
CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 1878-1879 at 91 (New York: Da Capo, 1969)
(1930).
61.
An Act to Prohibit the Issuance of Licenses to Aliens Not Eligible to Become
Electors of the State of California (Apr. 1 1880), quoted in In re Ah Chong, 2 F. 733, 734
(C.C.D. Ca. 1880).
62.
See id. See also In re Tiburcio Parrott, I F. 481 (C.C.D. Ca. 1880).
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not passed in pursuance of any public policy relating to the
fisheries of the state as an end to be attained, but simply as
a means of carrying out [California's] policy of excluding
the Chinese from the state . . . . The end to be
accomplished being unlawful...it is unlawful to use any
means to accomplish the unlawful object, however proper
the means might be if used in a proper case and for a
legitimate purpose. 63
Not long after, the Supreme Court recognized the importance of
economic freedom for the Chinese, when it struck down a regulation of
laundry facilities in San Francisco, in Yick Wo v. Hopkins.64 Although the
city argued that the law prohibiting the construction of laundry shops out of
wood was a public safety measure, intended to prevent fires, the Supreme
Court saw that it was "a covert attempt on the part of the municipality to
make an arbitrary and unjust discrimination against the Chinese race., 65 It
was an instance of the white faction using its political power to oppress an
unpopular minority-an extremely effective form of oppression. "[T]he
very idea," said the Court, "that one man may be compelled to hold
his.. .means of living.. .at the mere will of another, seems to be intolerable in
any country where freedom prevails, as being the essence of slavery
itself."66 Yick Wo is especially important because it protected the freedom
of contract against a facially neutral law: the laundry regulation did not
explicitly discriminate between Chinese-run laundries and laundries run by
members of other races. Moreover, the Court did not apply the heightened
scrutiny that it today applies in cases of racial discrimination 67 because the
scheme of varying standards of scrutiny had not yet been devised. Instead,
Yick Wo recognized a principle that what appear to be equal laws can often
operate for the benefit of politically powerful groups, at the expense of
those less favored. As Rebecca Brown recently put it, "laws that provide
that 'no one may [blank]' can exploit difference as effectively as a[n
explicit] classification, when the blank is an activity that 'we,' the political
ins, have no wish to do, but that 'they,' the outs, claim a profound need to

63.
64.
65.

Yick Wo).

66.

Ah Chong, 2 F. at 737.
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 550 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (citing

Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 370.
67.
See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) ("[AIII racial
classifications, imposed by whatever federal, state, or local governmental actor, must be
analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny.").
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,68

By refusing to take a formalistic
do in pursuit of personal fulfillment."
posture, and looking instead at the actual function and purpose of the law,
the Yick Wo Court was able to protect the right of Chinese immigrants to
earn a living.69
Economic exclusion can often take various pretexts, including, as we
have noted, the pretext of consumer protection. 70 Another common pretext
This is
for economic exclusion was to "aid" the "less fortunate."
particularly evident in cases involving sex discrimination, which has often
had an economic component. In Bradwell v. Illinois,7 1 Myra Bradwell
challenged a prohibition on women practicing law. Relying on The
Slaughter House Cases72 , the Court rejected her argument, and in a
separate concurrence, Justice Bradley wrote that law, like
nature herself, has always recognized a wide difference in
the respective spheres and destinies of man and woman.
Man is, or should be, woman's protector and defender.
The natural and proper timidity and delicacy which
unfits it for many of
belongs to the female sex evidently
73
the occupations of civil life.
But while the law's passage had likely been motivated by this
Victorian presumption of female inferiority, it also had the not-socoincidental effect of keeping women out of the legal profession, thereby
perpetuating an artificial shortage which kept the fees of male attorneys
higher. The Court emphasized this fact a half-century later, when it
reversed course and struck down a Washington, D.C., minimum wage law
which applied only to women. In Adkins v. Children's Hospital,74 the
Court held that "the right to contract about one's affairs is a part of the

Rebecca L. Brown, Liberty, The New Equality, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1491, 1498
68.
(2002).
69.
As Justice Field put it in another case striking down a facially neutral, but
actually discriminatory, law, "When we take our seats on the bench we are not struck with
blindness, and forbidden to know as judges what we see as men." Ho Ah Kow v. Nunan, 12
F. Cas. 252, 255 (1879).
70.
See infra, text accompanying notes 164-72. See also Lawrence M. Friedman,
Freedom of Contractand OccupationalLicensing, 53 CAL. L. REV. 487, 519-20 (1965).
71.
83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872).
72.
83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872), cited in Bradwell, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 139.
73.
Bradwell, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 141.
74.
261 U.S. 525 (1923).
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liberty of the individual protected by [the Due Process] clause.
minimum wage law

75

The

is not for the protection of persons under legal disability or
for the prevention of fraud. It is simply and exclusively a
price-fixing law, confined to adult women . . . who are
legally as capable of contracting for themselves as men. It
forbids two parties
having lawful capacity . . . to freely
76
contract ....
It is noteworthy that the plaintiff, Willie Lyons was an elevator
operator who had lost her job because of the law. While the law may have
served social mores to some degree, it also acted as a tariff on employing
women, shifting economic power toward men. 77

75.
76.
77.

Id. at 545.

Id. at 554.
Justice Ginsburg has described the tension between Bradwell and Adkins:
[Liegislation apparently designed to benefit or protect women could
often, perversely, have the opposite effect. This was of critical
importance, for most laws that differentiated on the basis of sex, in
contrast to obviously odious race-based laws, did so ostensibly to shield
or favor the sex regarded as fairer, but weaker, and dependent-prone.
Laws prescribing the maximum number of hours or the times of day
women could work or the minimum wages they could receive; laws
barring females from "hazardous" or "inappropriate" occupations
(lawyering in the nineteenth century, bartending in the mid-twentieth
century) ... all these prescriptions and proscriptions were premised on
the notion that women could not cope with the world beyond hearth and
home without a father, husband, or big brother to guide them.
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Constitutional Adjudication in the United States As a Means of
Advancing the Equal Statute of Men and Women Under the Law, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 263,
269-70 (1997). See also Susan Low Bloch & Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Celebrating The 200th
Anniversary of the Federal Courts of the Districtof Columbia, 90 GEO. L.J. 549, 597 (2002)
(echoing criticism of sexist labor legislation). One might imagine that Justice Ginsburg
would follow through with her criticism and consider Adkins rightly decided. Yet she
joined Justice Souter's lengthy dissent in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44
(1996), in which he attacked Adkins. See id. at 166. Justice Souter has even likened Adkins
to Dred Scott. See Washington v. Glucksberg 521 U.S. 702, 761 (1997) (Souter, J.,
dissenting). I have criticized this view at length. See Sandefur, Right to Earn A Living,
supra note 12, at 250-53.
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III. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN EQUAL PROTECTION JURISPRUDENCE

In the decades since Bradwell, Yick Wo, and Adkins, the Court has
adopted a mechanism of judicial review which refers to varying standards
of judicial scrutiny. Under this scheme, laws which infringe on so-called
"fundamental rights," or "creates 'suspect classes'," are subject to strict
scrutiny, while laws affecting "not-so-fundamental" rights-namely, the
right to property, or to earn a living-are subjected only to rational basis
scrutiny. Under rational basis scrutiny, a court will strike down a law only
when it is not "rationally related" to a conceivably legitimate government
interest. The ambiguity of this test is striking, particularly since the courts
have never clearly explained the limits of the "legitimate government
interest" prong.78
Moreover, some courts have held that the rational basis test does not
require that the state's asserted basis for the law be the actual basis on
which the legislature passed the law. 79 Further, some courts have held that
the law does not actually have to be a rational solution in order to pass the
test; paradoxical as it seems, even policies which, as a matter of economic
law, cannot accomplish the law's purported goals, might be sustained
under such scrutiny,80 since the court asks only whether a legislator could
have believed the policy would be effective. This ambiguity has led to the
modern assumption that virtually any law will pass the rational basis test.
Further, it has led to the compelling observation that using the test in some
cases and not in others demonstrates the court's prejudice with regard to
moral and political values: 8 1 the prevailing "double standard" reveals that

78.
See Nollan v. California Coastal Com., 483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987) ("Our cases
have not elaborated on the standards for determining what constitutes a 'legitimate state
interest."'). As Richard A. Epstein has put it, "the legitimate state interest test in vogue
today is a bare conclusion, tantamount to asserting that the action is legitimate because it is
. [and] functions, at best, as a convenient label for serious inquiry, without
EPSTEIN, TAKINGS
109 (1985). See also Richard A. Epstein, The "Necessary" History of Property And

lawful . .

.

defining the set of permissible ends of government action." RICHARD A.

Liberty, 6 CHAP. L. REV. 1, 3 (2003) ("the so-called 'rational basis' test is the death knell of
serious constitutional discourse").
See United States Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179 (1980).
79.
80.
See Richardson v. Honolulu, 124 F.3d. 1150 (9th Cir. 1997). The Richardson
Court struck down a condemnation law under the "substantial effects" test applicable to
land-use regulations but upheld a rent control ordinance against a due process challenge
because that challenge was reviewed under "rational basis" scrutiny. Id. at 1162, 1165.
81.
See United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26, 41-42 (1994) (Scalia and Thomas,
JJ., concurring) ("The picking and choosing among various rights to be accorded
Isubstantive due process' protection is alone enough to arouse suspicion; but the categorical
and inexplicable exclusion of so-called 'economic rights' (even though the Due Process
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to be
courts simply do not think economic liberties are important enough
82
protected by anything more than an illusory standard of scrutiny.
The Court has sometimes denied that the system of varying standards
of review really works this way, writing, for instance, that "the dichotomy
between personal liberties and property rights is a false one ... . That rights
• in property are basic civil rights has long been recognized, ' 83 and that
' 84
property rights should not be "relegated to the status of a poor relation.
But in practice, varying standards of review have leaned strongly against
economic freedoms, because the rationality test is too vague to perform
serious legal work.
But, in recent years, the double standard has begun to break down. 85
The Court has already found the simple rational basis/strict scrutiny
dichotomy insufficient to address many cases. One attempt to solve this
problem, and impose some theoretical rigor on rational basis scrutiny, takes
' 86
the form of what some commentators call "rational basis with bite " applying a rational basis test that does not ignore the fit between the
asserted purposes of a regulation and the means the legislature chooses
when pursuing that end. Because it is still a rational basis test, the fit does
not need to be exact, but by preventing the state from burdening groups for

Clause explicitly applies to 'property') unquestionably involves policymaking rather than
neutral legal analysis.").
82.
See Roger Pilon, The Purpose and Limits of Government, Cato's Letters No. 13
at 31 (1999), available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/catosletters/cl-13.pdf (visited Feb. 26,
2003) ("The value-laden distinction between two kinds of rights [i.e., economic versus
fundamental rights] ... is nowhere to be found in the Constitution .... It was written from
whole cloth to pave the way for the redistributive and regulatory programs of the New
Deal.").
83.
Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 552 (1972).
84.
Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 392 (1994).
85.
See, e.g., 518 U.S. 515, 531, 555 (1996) (referring to "heightened" and
"skeptical" scrutiny); Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. F.C.C., 512 U.S. 622 (1994) (discussing at
length various standards of First Amendment scrutiny). The Court notably avoided
reference to standards of scrutiny at all in its recent decision in Lawrence v. Texas, 123
S.Ct. 2472 (2003), much to Justice O'Connor's surprise. See id. at 2484-85 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring). But Justice O'Connor also applied a bizarre version of "strict scrutiny" only
days later in Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003), when she deferred to administrative
decisionmaking. See id. at 328. These decisions further suggest the weakening of the
varying standards of review framework. As Roger Pilon has put it, "[olne is reminded of
nothing so much as medieval geocentric Ptolemaics drawing epicycle upon epicycle to ward
off the onslaught of the heliocentric Copernicans." Roger Pilon, How Constitutional
Corruption Has Led to Ideological Litmus Tests for Judicial Nominees, 7 NEXUS 61, 29
(2002), at http://www.nexusjournal.org/volume7.htm.
86.
See, e.g., Gayle Lynn Pettinga, Note, Rational Basis with Bite: Intermediate
Scrutiny by Any Other Name, 62 IND. L.J. 779 (1987); Steven M. Simpson, Judicial
Abdication and the Rise of Special Interests, 6 CHAP. L. REV. 173, 189 (2003).

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 24

no other reason than their unpopularity, this more serious version of
rationality review protects people against wrongs perpetrated by the
majority, while still leaving legislatures room to choose between policies.
This kind of scrutiny has two important features. First, it rests on the
clear statement that "a bare.., desire to harm a politically unpopular group
cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest." 87 The Court has used
this "rational basis with bite" to strike down discriminatory laws which
many commentators believe should have survived rational basis scrutiny,
most notably in in Romer v. Evans8 8 and City of Cleburne v. Cleburne
Living Center.89 Like Yick Wo, These cases declare that
negative attitudes, or fear, unsubstantiated by factors which

are properly cognizable [by government] . . . are not
permissible bases for treating ...[some people] differently
... and the City may not avoid the strictures of [the Equal

Protection] Clause by deferring to the wishes or objections
of some fraction of the body politic. 'Private biases may be
outside the reach of the law, but the law cannot, directly or
indirectly, give them effect. 90

Mere exclusion on grounds unrelated to legitimate constitutional
purposes is not permitted. 9'

87.
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634-35 (1996) (quoting Dep't of Agric. v.
Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973). Accord City of Cleburne v. Clebume Living Ctr., 473
U.S. 432, 447 (1985); Lawrence, 123 S.Ct. at 2485 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring). Compare In
Re Ah Chong, supra note 61.
88.
517 U.S. 620 (1996).
89.
473 U.S. 432 (1985). See also Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982)
(permanent distinctions for basing state benefits on date the person entered the state failed
rational basis test).
90.
Id. at 448 (quoting Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984)).
91.
Unfortunately, this sounds far more specific than it really is. It begs the
question to say that the Constitution prohibits government from making "irrelevant"
distinctions between citizens, since the factors considered "relevant" in making distinctions
are themselves subject to political influence and can be just about anything. See JASAY,
supra note 6, at 184
"whatever the foundation of the taboo variables [i.e., criteria considered
unconstitutional as bases for discrimination], it is not a firm but a
shifting one, contingent on cultural change. Currently taboo variables
are liable to be eroded or swept away by the next wave of political
correctness, whose reigning value judgments might well seem
outrageous, and outrageously un-general, to our own generation."
Solving this conundrum would require delineating clearly the limits of "legitimate state
interests," something the Court has been reluctant to do. Reference, however, to
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Secondly, these cases looked to the fit between means and ends,
barring the state from making distinctions between citizens when the
distinctions' "relationship to an asserted goal is so attenuated as to render
the distinction arbitrary or irrational. 9 2 According to this version of the
rational basis test, the Court should not invent rationales for a law, or defer
entirely to the legislature's decisions. Rather, the Court should ensure that
the law is not a pretextual exercise of the government's power. The
Cleburne Court, for instance, concluded that "in our view the record does
not reveal any rational basis for believing that the . . .home [for the
mentally retarded] would pose any special threat to the city's legitimate
interests,
a determination which suggests that even under rational
relationship scrutiny, the Court does not ignore the effects-or the
The Court went on to assess whether
effectiveness-of a law.
distinguishing between homes for the mentally retarded and fraternity
homes actually made sense.94 Clearly, the Court believed that rational
relationship scrutiny does not serve as a blank check for government
action.95 That principle was reiterated in Romer, when the Court noted that
even under rational basis review, "we insist on knowing the relation
between the classification adopted and the object to be attained .. .[to]
ensure that classifications are not drawn for the purpose of disadvantaging
the group burdened by the law." 96
This understanding of rational basis scrutiny is not limited to the nonIn cases such as Hooper v. Bernalillo County
economic context.
Assessor,97 Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward,98 and Williams v.
Vermont,99 the Court has struck down economic regulations under the
rational basis test, by assessing to at least some degree, the fit between
means adopted and ends pursued. °° That assessment allows the Court to
discern pretextual exercises of political power from legitimate regulations.
Such meaningful scrutiny is consistent with the framers'
understanding of equality. The state's ability to prohibit some people from
"background principles" of common law may be of some assistance in doing so. Cf Lucas
v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992).
92. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 446.
93. Id. at 448.
94.
Id. at 449.
95. See also Matthews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 510 (1976) (rational relationship
scrutiny is not toothless).
96. Romer, 517 U.S. at 632-33.
97. 472 U.S. 612 (1985).
98. 470 U.S. 869 (1985).
99. 472 U.S. 14 (1985).
100. See, e.g., id. at 24 ('The purposes of the statute would be identically served, and
with an identical burden, by taxing each.").

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 24

earning a living in order to benefit others comes into conflict with
principles of equality because it can be exploited in a manner inconsistent
with the principle that people should be judged on the basis of their
abilities, rather than their mere political strength. Cass Sunstein has
described this as the problem of "naked preferences."''0 1 The Equal
Protection Clause, along with other parts of the Constitution,' 0 2 prohibits
"distribution of resources or opportunities to one group rather than another
solely on the ground that those favored have exercised the raw political
power to obtain what they want."' 1 3 The unfairness of doing so was
prohibited as part of the framers' concern with "the mischiefs 1°
of6
faction." °4 Factions, 10 5 as modern public choice economists point out,
will invest time and money in capturing government powers for their own
benefit, so long as doing so will be profitable to them. One of the framers'
primary concerns was to prevent factions from usurping government power
"solely to distribute wealth or opportunities to one group or person at the
expense of another."' 1 7 As early as 1788, James Madison warned that in
America, "the invasion of private rights is cheifly [sic] to be apprehended..
• from acts in which the Government is the mere instrument of the major
number of the constituents." 0 8 The role of the courts was therefore to
force the majority to obey the law, and thus prevent the tyranny of the
majority.19 As one early court put it, the Equal Protection Clause:

101.

Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and The Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REV.

108.

Letter to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788) in MADISON: WRITINGS 418, 421 (J.

1689 (1984). Of course, the framers found such preferences abhorrent when they were
clothed, also!
102.
In particular, Sunstein cites "the dormant commerce, privileges and immunities,
equal protection, due process, contract, and eminent domain clauses." Id. at 1689. One
might also add U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 6, which prohibits Congress from giving trade
preferences to one state over another.
103.
Id. at 1689. See also Simpson, supra note 86, at 173.
104.
FederalistNo. 10, supra note 35, at 81.
105.
Madison defined a faction as "a number of citizens, whether amounting to a
majority or minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of
passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and
aggregate interests of the community." Id. at 78.
106.
See generally JAMES BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF
CONSENT (Ann Arbor Paperbacks 1965).
107.
Sunstein, supra note 101, at 1690.
Rakove ed. 1999).
109.
See James Madison, Speech in Congress Proposing Constitutional Amendments
(June 8, 1789), reprinted in id. at 437, 449 (defending Bill of Rights because "independent
tribunals of justice will ... be an impenetrable bulwark against every assumption of power
in the legislative ....
").
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[W]as intended to secure to weak and unpopular minorities
and individuals, equal rights with the majority, who from
the nature of our government exercise the legislative
power. Any other construction of the constitution would
set up the majority in the government as a many-headed
tyrant, with capacity and power to oppress the minority at
pleasure, by odious laws binding on the latter. 0
When courts defer too much, they leave the minority at the mercy of
the majority, and thus endanger the very concept of equality.
IV.

THE ILLEGITIMACY OF EXCLUSION

In several contexts, courts have explained that principles of equality
prohibit the government from closing out fair competition for the benefit of
politically favored groups, or from protecting the government's own
industries from competition. For instance, in cases involving the dormant
Commerce Clause, "which holds that the Constitution's exclusive grant to
Congress of power to regulate commerce between the states"' prohibits
states from regulating in such a way that interferes with interstate
commerce," 112 the Court has held that states may not regulate in a
protectionist manner.
In City of Philadelphiav. New Jersey,"l4 the Court struck down a New
Jersey law which prohibited the importation of most solid waste from
outside the state. Owners of private landfills in New Jersey challenged the
law, because they had already negotiated contracts with other states to
handle solid waste. The Court explained that the Commerce Clause was
primarily intended to break down the interstate trade barriers which had
existed under the Articles of Confederation." 5 Since the states "are not

110.
Waily's Heirs v. Kennedy, 10 Tenn. (2 Yer.) 554, 557 (1831).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
111.
112.
See, e.g., Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564,
577-78 (1997).
113.
See also U.S. CONST. art I, § 10, cl. 2 (prohibiting states from taxing imports or
exports).
114.
437 U.S. 617 (1978).
115.
Id. at 623-24.
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separable economic units,"' 16 they are prohibited from
' 7 passing legislation
which establishes "simple economic protectionism." "
Some commentators argue that the dormant Commerce Clause
prohibits economic protectionism solely as a structural matter, and not as a
reflection of the framers' underlying belief in the political economy of free
markets." 8 But for the framers, federalism was not an end in itself; rather,
it was a mechanism for protecting individual freedom." 9 As the Court has
observed:
Our system, fostered by the Commerce Clause, is that
every farmer and every craftsman shall be encouraged to
produce by the certainty that he will have free access to
every market in the Nation, that no home embargoes will
withhold his exports, and no foreign state will by customs
duties or regulations exclude them. Likewise, every
consumer may look to the free competition from every
producing area in12 the Nation to protect him from
exploitation by any. 0
These concerns also underlay the Privileges and Immunities Clause of
Article V,121 which protects the right of citizens to travel from state to state
This right has been characterized as
to engage in business.
23
fundamental; one of the primary reasons for creating a supreme, federal

116.

(1949)).

Id. at 623 (quoting H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 538

117. City of Philadelphia,437 U.S. at 624.
118. See, e.g., Richard B. Collins, Economic Union as a Constitutional Value, 63
N.Y.U. L. REV.43 (1988).
119. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 45, supra note 35, at 289
Was, then, the American Revolution effected, was the American
Confederacy formed, was the precious blood of thousands spilt, and the
hard-earned substance of millions lavished, not that the people of
America should enjoy peace, liberty, and safety, but that the
governments of the individual States, that particular municipal
establishments, might enjoy a certain extent of power and be arrayed
with certain dignities and attributes of sovereignty? ... [N]o form of
government whatever has any other value than as it may be fitted for the
attainment of this object.
id. at 289.
120. Du Mond, 336 U.S. at 539.
U.S. CONST. Art. V § 1.
121.
122. See, e.g., Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274 (1985).
123. See Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 551 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823). Indeed, the
privileges and immunities clause is modeled on the Magna Carta's provision that merchants
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government. 124 Economic regulations which discriminate based on state
citizenship violate one of the central purposes of the federal system. The
Interstate Commerce Clause works in conjunction with the Privileges and
Immunities Clause to prohibit states from unreasonably interfering with the
right of American citizens to engage in business intrastate. "[A] citizen of
State A who ventures into State B" is entitled to "the same privileges which
the citizens of State B enjoy."'' 25 The connection to the principle of
equality is clear: the Constitution prohibits "discrimination against citizens
of other States where there is no substantial reason for the discrimination
beyond the mere fact that they are citizens of other States," although "it
does not preclude disparity of treatment in the many situations where there
are perfectly valid independent reasons for it.' 26 Since it would undermine
the purpose of the Privileges and Immunities Clause-and of the federal
system itself-to allow states to create trade barriers between them,
protectionism does not qualify
as a perfectly valid reason for discrimination
27
against out-of-state parties. 1
Discrimination in interstate trade is only a political manifestation of
the same problem that lay at the heart of Yick Wo, except that instead of a
faction of American nativists using government to deprive the Chinese of
economic opportunity, dormant commerce clause cases involve a faction in
one state using their own government to deprive out-of-state traders of
economic opportunity. The faces are different, but the principle is the
same. As if to prove that, in MetropolitanLife v. Ward, the Court noted the
connection between the Equal Protection and Commerce Clauses when it

should be free to travel for purposes of trade. See Sandefur,, supra note 11, at 209.
124.
See, e.g., Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 395-96 (1948); Hicklin v. Orbeck,
437 U.S. 518 (1978); United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Mayor of Camden, 465 U.S.
208 (1984).
125.
Witsell, 334 U.S. at 396.
126.
Id. at 396.
127.
This is even true in cases involving interstate shipments of alcohol. States have
power under the Twenty-First Amendment to ban alcohol entirely if they choose, an
extensive power indeed. U.S. CONST. amend XXI § 2. Yet such bans are not allowed when
they are created solely to protect native alcohol producers. Since the amendment did not
repeal the Commerce Clause, but was passed simply to confirm the police power of states to
protect citizens from the negative effects of alcohol, the Court has held that the Twenty-First
Amendment must be read consistently with the clause, rather than as a modification of it.
Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp., 377 U.S. 324, 332 (1964). Thus "one thing
is certain: the central purpose of the provision was not to empower States to favor local
liquor industries by erecting barriers to competition. It is also beyond doubt that the
Commerce Clause itself furthers strong federal interests in preventing economic
Balkanization." Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 276 (1984).
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held that "parochial [economic] discrimination
[is w]hat the Equal
128
Protection Clause was intended to prevent."'
The Court has prohibited commercial favoritism in other cases, as
well, where the connection between economic enterprise and other
129
freedoms has been closer. For instance, Grosjean v. American Press Co.
involved a special tax levied on a group of newspapers in Louisiana. The
tax applied only to papers with a circulation over 20,000-which happened
to include almost entirely newspapers critical of the state's powerful
Senator Huey P. Long. 30 The Court struck down the tax, noting that it was
"a deliberate and calculated device in the guise of a tax to limit the
circulation of information."' 31 Although Grosjean suggested that taxes on
newspapers violated the First Amendment regardless of their stated or
actual purposes, the Court has since explained that Grosjean was primarily
motivated by a concern for the possibility that politicians might restrict the
freedom of the press to insulate themselves from criticism.13 The tax
imposed in Grosjean violated the constitution because when government is
used to prevent fair competition, it is not applying the law equally.
Education is another context in which the Court has stopped attempts
by factions to use government to exclude their own competition. Pierce v.
Society of Sisters133 involved an Oregon law which required parents to send
children to public schools, and thus put private schools out of business.
The case is famous for recognizing the fundamental right of parents to
direct the upbringing of their children, 134 but the appellees included the
operators of a private school, and the grounds for their challenge to the
Oregon law was that it obstructed their freedom of contract. 135 As the
Court noted, the question was not whether the state could "reasonably...
regulate all schools, to inspect, supervise and examine them, their teachers
and pupils,' 36 but rather to what degree the state could engage in

128.
470 U.S. 869, 878 (1985) (emphasis added).
129.
297 U.S. 233 (1936).
130.
Long, known as "Kingfish," was a charismatic socialist reformer whose
political power even concerned Franklin Roosevelt. Long's career was cut short, however,
by an assassin in 1935. See T.O. HARRIS, KINGFISH: HUEY P. LONG (1968).
131.
Grosjean, 297 U.S. at 250. Although the Grosjean Court did not discuss

Long's involvement in the case, the facts are reviewed in, Minneapolis Star and Tribune Co.
v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 579-80 (1983).
132. Id. See also United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938)
(characterizing the law in Grosjean as a law which "restrict[ed] those political processes
which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation").
133.
268 U.S. 510 (1925).
134.
See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000).
135.
See Pierce,268 U.S. at 531-32.

136.

Id.
at 534.
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"arbitrary, unreasonable, and unlawful interference with their patrons and
the consequent destruction of their business and property."' 37 The Oregon
statute was yet another instance of one group using state power to exclude
competition-in this case, prohibiting competition with state-run
schools. 138
A similar point was made more recently in a series of antitrust cases
against the American Medical Association. Beginning in the 1960s, the
AMA adopted rules which prohibited member doctors from referring
patients to chiropractors. Several chiropractors filed suit, alleging that the
AMA's anti-referral policy was a contract in restraint of trade in violation
of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. 139 The AMA replied that preventing
doctors from referring patients to chiropractors was a legitimate way of
protecting the public from chiropractic, which the AMA considers a
pseudoscience. The courts found for the chiropractors.
Getting needed information to the market is a fine goal, but
the district court found that the AMA was not motivated
solely by such altruistic concerns. Indeed, the court found
that the AMA intended to "destroy a competitor," namely,
chiropractors. It is not enough to carry the day to argue
that competition should be eliminated in the name of
public safety. 140
Although governments are generally immune from prosecution under
the Sherman Act,14 1 this rationale ought to apply equally to state

137. Id. at 536.
138. Pierce is often grouped with Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), in which
the Court struck down a law prohibiting schools from teaching students German. The law
was held to violate substantive due process. Id. at 399 ("Without doubt, it denotes not
merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to
engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry,
establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own
conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as
essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men."). The law not only violated the
rights of parents, but "attempted materially to interfere with the calling of modem language
teachers."
Id. at 401. The facts of Meyer were a manifestation of the anti-German
sentiment popular in the United States during and after World War I, see id. at 402, which
led to the use of government by a nativist faction to oppress a weaker party.
139. Wilk v. AMA, 895 F.2d 352 (7th Cir. 1990); Chiropractic Coop. Ass'n of
Michigan v. AMA, 867 F.2d 270 (6th Cir. 1989).
140. Wilk, 895 F.2d at 361 (citing Nat'l Soc'y of Prof'l Engineers v. United States,
435 U.S. 679 (1978)).
141. See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350-51 (1943); Columbia v. Omni Outdoor
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regulation. 142 The evils that the Sherman Act were directed against are just
as likely to arise from government regulation as from private anticompetitive practices. 143 After all, the AMA has a special place in the
regulation of medicine, since the AMA sets ethical standards for the
practice of medicine, 144 as well as supervising essentially all American
medical education. 145 It is not a government agency, but like many
powerful trade organizations, such as state bar organizations, it exercises a
great deal of government-like control over its members.' 46 If the
government must protect consumers from the ill effects of monopolies,
then monopolistic practices by government licensing agencies should also
be prohibited. The potential victims are the same (consumers); the
potential injury is the same (unreasonable prices); and the potential
Advertising, Inc., 499 U.S. 365 (1991).
142.
See City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 419-20
(1978) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
143.
See, e.g., Park 'N Fly of Texas, Inc. v. City of Houston, 327 F. Supp. 910 (S.D.
Tex. 1971); Comment, The Federal Government's Antitrust Immunity-Trade As I Say, Not
As I Do, 56 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 515 (1982). See also Edward B. Whitney, Constitutional
Questions under The FederalAntitrust Law, 7 YALE L. J. 285, 290 (1898) ("assuming that
Congress has the power to prohibit all combinations in restraint of interstate or foreign
commerce . . . does it necessarily follow that the State legislatures have the power to
interfere with all the avocations of life? I think not.").
144.
See Keith B. Leffler, Physician Licensure: Competition and Monopoly in
American Medicine, 21 J.L. & EcON. 165, 172-74 (1978); John J. Smith, Legal Implications
of Specialty Board Certification, 17 J. LEGAL MED. 73, 73-76 (1996) (describing how
medical specialty certification is "largely controlled by the AMA" and similar groups. Id. at
76); Andrew Ferris and Griffin Seiler, Health Care Reform: A Free-Market Proposal, 7
Loy. CONSUMER L. REP. 45 (1995) (describing how occupational licensing in medicine led
to "an overall increase in prices and market transaction costs" Id. at 50.).
145.
See Clark C. Havighurst and Peter M. Brody, Accrediting And The Sherman
Act, 57-AUT LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 199, 233 (1994) (describing how "the AMA
participates with dominant organizations in various allied health fields in credentialing
health care personnel and accreditin- their training programs"); Wilk v. American Medical
Ass'n, 719 F.2d 207, 212 (6th Cir. 1983); Andrew Ferris and Griffin Seiler, Health Care
Reform: A Free-Market Proposal, 7 LOY. CONSUMER L. REP. 45, 53 (1995).
146.
Most states now require that, in order to take the state's bar exam, a bar
candidate must have graduated from a law school accredited by the American Bar
Association. The result is that it is impossible to practice law in those states unless one has
graduated from an ABA school. See Marina Lao, Discrediting Accreditation?: Antitrust
And Legal Education, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 1035 (2001). While the ABA may remain private
in name, it has become a defacto government licensing agency, since it serves as a cut-off
for the practice of law in those states. As Lao notes, "any accreditation program where
market participants wield the power to exclude, there is an inherent conflict of interest and a
risk of anticompetitive abuse." Id. at 1036-37. See Timothy Sandefur, Note: Dinosaur
TRACS: The Approaching Conflict between Establishment Clause Jurisprudence And
College Accreditation Procedures, 7 NEXUS J. Op. 79 (2002) (describing accreditation
process).
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wrongdoers are the same (monopolistic producers). The apparatus may be
different-private anti-competitive agreements on one hand, and political
control over licensing agencies
on the other-but it is unclear why this
47
should make a difference.1

At least the following is clear: the Equal Protection Clause prohibits
government from extending benefits to some and burdens to others solely
on the basis of their political prowess. 48 This principle ought to applyand in some cases has been applied-when the burdens involved are
economic ones, and where the parties are being excluded or benefitted
solely for political reasons, as well as for the more traditional concerns of
equal protection cases, such as racial discrimination. The right to earn a
living is especially important for the poor, and members of racial
minorities, 49 although the evils caused by the deprivation of that right are
not confined to them. Licensing laws and other barriers to entry-even
when not motivated by racial prejudice, but merely by the natural desire of
insiders for protection against entrepreneurs-can be every bit as
burdensome as other types of inequalities. A serious equal protection
jurisprudence must therefore be on the lookout for pretextual uses of the
government power, which burden some groups and benefit others.
In a recent dissenting opinion involving land use regulation, Judge
Richard Posner demonstrated how a court should undertake the
Romer/Cleburne version of rationality review.' 50 Under that standard,
"discrimination against sensitive uses is to be given more careful, realistic,
skeptical scrutiny by the courts than discrimination against purely
commercial activities."' '5 Although bias against unpopular groups is not,
by itself, reason for finding a violation of the equal protection clause, it
does require the courts to be skeptical, to guard against violations of
individual rights which might be kept out of view by rational basis

147.
See Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 584 (1984) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
148.
See also Ranschburg v. Toan, 709 F.2d 1207, 1211 (8th Cir. 1983) ("[I]t is
untenable to suggest that a state's decision to favor one group of recipients over another by
itself qualifies as a legitimate state interest. An intent to discriminate is not a legitimate
state interest."); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Rodriguez, 238 F. Supp. 2d 395, 416 (D.P.R.
2002) ("Protectionism itself, or promoting in-state business by discriminating against outof-state participants, is not a legitimate state interest."); Tyson Foods, Inc. v. McReynolds,
700 F. Supp. 906, 912 (M.D. Tenn. 1988) ("Insulating local operations of a nonresident
corporation from interstate competition is not a legitimate state interest."); City of Guthrie v.
Pike & Long, 243 P.2d 697, 700-01 (Okla. 1952); Benson v. Zoning Board of Appeals of
City of Hartford, 27 A.2d 389, 391 (Conn. 1942) (citing cases).
149.
See Sandefur, Get Therefrom Here, supra note 42.
th
Civil Liberties for Urban Believers v. City of Chicago, 342 F.3d 152, 768 (7
150.
Cir. 2003) (Posner, J., dissenting).
151.
Id. at 769.
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scrutiny. 152 Adopting the analogy of the marketplace of ideas,' 53 Judge
Posner noted that "[r]eligious competition presupposes free entry into the
religious 'marketplace.""0 54 The law was essentially protecting established
churches against "new, small, or impecunious churches,
and Posner
argued against the majority's "absurdly paternalistic argument[s]" which
justified the regulation on the grounds that it protected the church against
itself. 56 Posner concluded that the zoning regulations did violate the Equal
Protection Clause because they were motivated by the same "negative
attitudes" which the Cleburne says should increase the court's suspicion.
There is no clear reason why Judge Posner's interpretation, made in
explicit analogy to the operation of the economic marketplace, should not
also apply in that actual marketplace. Just as he concluded the zoning
ordinance "discriminate[d ] in favor of well-established sects,' 57 licensing
laws and other regulations frequently discriminate in favor of established
businesses, which are either grandfathered in, or are so established that they
can influence the process in their favor. If religious discrimination, aided
by the government's regulatory power to regulate land use, violates the
equal protection clause, then economic discrimination, aided by the
government's regulatory power over businesses, is a danger as well.
Perhaps most important is the issue of pretext. One of the purposes of
judicial review itself is to prevent the government from using clever
stratagems for doing what it is not permitted to do. As one of the courts
that struck down California's anti-Chinese laws put it, the courts ought to
prevent legislatures from "accomplish [ing], by indirection and

152.

John Harrison, Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 101 YALE

L.J. 1385, 1468 (1992) (noting that rights violations are often "hidden by the assumption,
built into 'rational basis scrutiny,' that [govenrment] generally do[es] not act for forbidden
purposes").
153.
The term "marketplace of ideas" in the First Amendment context is often
ascribed to Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes' dissent in Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S.
616, 630 (1919). The actual phrase "marketplace of ideas" first appeared in Eskridge v.
Division of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 30 N.J.Super. 472, 476 (1954), and was then
adopted by Justice William Brennan. See Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 308
(1965) (Brennan, J., concurring). But similar analogies are centuries old. Compare John
Milton, Areopagitica, reprinted in THE STUDENT'S MILTON 751 (F. Patterson ed. 1933)

(1654) ("though all the winds of doctrine were let loose to play upon the earth, so truth be in
the field, we do injuriously by licensing and prohibiting to misdoubt her strength. Let her
and falsehood grapple; who ever knew truth put to the worse, in a free and open
encounter?")
154.
Civil Liberties for Urban Believers, 342 F.3d at 770.
155.

156.
157.

Id.

Id. at 772.
id. at 770.
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circumlocution, an unconstitutional purpose which they cannot effect by
direct means."'' 58 If government may not exclude some groups from the
marketplace solely because of their political unpopularity, then it must not
be allowed to do so indirectly. This requires courts to apply a meaningful
scrutiny to government regulations to ensure that they are not pretexts for
discrimination.
V.

BARBERS, SHOE SHINERS, AND CASKET SELLERS

What would a meaningful rationality review in economic regulation
cases look like? Those who believe the courts should not protect economic
liberty against such regulation routinely raise the specter of Lochner v. New
York, 159 and argue that the courts should not do what the Lochner Court
allegedly did: apply its preferred economic policy under the guise of due
process jurisprudence. 160 But as Romer, Cleburne, and similar cases have
demonstrated, a realistic rationality review need not intrude upon the ability
of legislatures to make legitimate policies. Rather, courts would do what
they already do in cases involving other types of discrimination: ensure that
the legislature is pursuing a genuine and reasonable public policy, rather
than protecting insiders against competition. This does not mean writing
law from the bench, but rather, ensuring that the legislatures do not go
beyond their constitutional bounds. 16 1 The Constitution protects the
individual's right to self-actualization in a variety of contexts, whether it be
freedom of expression, sexual freedom, or freedom of religion.' 62 If the
Court is serious that "choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are

158.
Ah Chong, 2 F. at 740. See also M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.)
316, 423 (1819) ("Should congress, in the execution of its powers, adopt measures which
are prohibited by the constitution; or should congress, under the pretext of executing its
powers, pass laws for the accomplishment of objects not intrusted to the government; it
would become the painful duty of this tribunal, should a case requiring such a decision come
before it, to say, that such an act was not the law of the land.").
159.
198 U.S. 45 (1905).
160.

But see BERNARD SIEGAN, ECONOMIC LIBERTIES AND THE CONSTITUTION 94-95

(1980) (the charge "that natural rights theory gave unlimited discretion to judges ... does
not lack basis, but experience has shown that the problem is not much different from that
confronted by courts when they interpret the array of imprecise terms and provisions that
permeate the Constitution.")
161.
"Judicial restraint does not consist in deferring to a legislature that has exceeded
its constitutional authority." Robert A. Levy, The Conservative Split on Punitive Damages,
2002 CATO SUPREME COURT REVIEW 159, 172.

162.
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851
(1992); Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S.Ct. 2472 (2003).
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central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment,"' 163 then it is
inconsistent to allow the state to deprive individuals of their economic
rights without some compelling justification. As Laurence Tribe has
written, failing to protect economic rights "overlooks the importance of
property and contract in protecting the dispossessed no less than the
established; it forgets the political impotence of the isolated job-seeker who
has been fenced out of an occupation . . . ."64 then it is inconsistent to
allow the state to deprive individuals of their economic rights without some
compelling justification. As Laurence Tribe has written, failing to protect
economic rights "overlooks the importance of property and contract in
protecting the dispossessed no less than the established; it forgets the
political impotence of the isolated job-seeker who has been fenced out of
an occupation ....65
Examples of how economic freedom is central to self-definition, and
of how the courts have used serious equal protection jurisprudence to
protect that right, can be found in such seemingly mundane professions as
cosmetology, shoe shining, and the sale of coffins.
A.

HAIR BRAIDING

I noted above that occupational licensing was often used as a
discriminatory mechanism in the practice of barbering. In the late
nineteenth century, licensing laws for barbers were routinely passed under
the pretext of protecting public safety, 166 even though, as one dissenting
judge complained in an early case, "all the rest of mankind know full well
that the control of the barber business by the board and its licensees is the
sole end in view[.]' ' 167 Combined with racial discrimination, the power to
exclude unpopular groups from entry-level jobs became an effective tool of
racial suppression. 168 In Chaires v. City of Atlanta,169 the Georgia Supreme

163.

164.
165.

Lawrence,, 123 S.Ct. at 2481 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 851).

LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1374 (2d ed. 1988).
LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1374 (2d ed. 1988).

166.
See Friedman, supra note 70, at 519.
167.
State v. Walker, 92 P. 775, 778 (1907) (Rudkin, J.,
dissenting).
168.
Barbering and shoe-shining were among the personal services businesses that
black Americans have found more open to them in light of pervasive discrimination in
industrial America. See Wilton Hyman, Empowerment Zones, Enterprise Communities,
Black Business, And Unemployment, 53 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 143, 161 (1998);

Robert E. Suggs, Bringing Small Business Development to Urban Neighborhoods,30 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 487, 490-91 (1995); Stephen Plass, Judicial Versus Legislative Charting
of National Economic Policy: PlottingA Democratic Coursefor Minority Entrepreneurs,24
Loy. L.A. L. REV. 655, 674 (1991).
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Court struck down an Atlanta ordinance proclaiming that "no colored
barbers shall serve, as a barber, white women, white girls, or children under
the age of 14 years old" and that "[a]ll barber shops in the city of Atlanta
shall hereafter be closed, during week days, at 7 o'clock p. m., except on
Saturday, when they shall close at 9 o'clock p. M.' 70 The court noted that
"[p]ersons engaged in the operation of barber shops are carrying on a
perfectly lawful business. It is not, in any sense of the word, a noxious
business. In fact, the business may be regarded as indispensable in the
present development of our civilization, if we have regard to the
requirements of decency and cleanliness."'' 7 The court struck down the
law on equality grounds, because barbers were "singled ...out from the
thousands of [their] fellows in other employments, and told that, willy
nilly, [they] shall not work [at certain hours] . . . . If he labors, he is a
criminal. Such protection to labor, carried a little further, would send him
from the jail to the poorhouse."1 72 The court rejected the city's absurd
argument that the law was a valid protection of health and safety,'7 3 and
held that "[t]he right to carry on a lawful business is here denied to one
class of the citizens of the state, and the denial is based upon a distinction
which is not permissible under the Constitution to make. It is the
distinction that is based upon the color of that class of citizens to whom is
denied the 74
right, in part, to carry on their business and to earn a
livelihood."'
Unfortunately, Chaires was an unusual case in which the racial
conflict was extraordinarily clear, leaving the court no wiggle-room. 75 But
in cases where barbering statutes were facially neutral, courts were more
willing to take a formalistic view of the law and to accept the proffered
health-and-safety rationale. 76 One way in which licensing statutes

169.
139 S.E. 559 (Ga. 1927).
170.
Id. at 559.
171.
Id. at 561.
172.
Id. (quoting Exparte Jentzsch, 44 P. 803, 804 (Cal. 1896)).
173.
Id. at 564-65.
174.
Id. at 563. The court succumbed to absurdity itself, however, when it attempted
to distinguish the barber law from the state's other segregation laws. Segregation laws, the
court said, "are merely regulatory and do not destroy nor impinge upon property rights. The
necessity for them grows out of social habits and traditions of the Southern States and the
situation of our people relative to the colored race, and the absolute and unchanging
necessity of keeping the races separate." Id. at 565.
175.
See Friedman, supra note 70, at 515 ("[Only in specific instances where the
statute was crudely worded or blatantly conceived, and where group clashed with group in
an unusually clear-cut conflict, was the court's perception of the issue jolted from its normal
line of vision.").
176.
See BERNSTEIN, supra note 44, at 37-41.
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achieved their discriminatory effect was through burdensome licensure
requirements: rather than requiring just a licensing fee, a cosmetology
license generally requires extensive education, technical training, and a
substantial investment merely to take the license exam. And the hairstyling
techniques that made up the cosmetology training were often themselves
racially biased: hairstylists were required to learn techniques and hairstyles
only popular-or even possible-among whites. Not all cosmetology
licensing-nor licensing in general-was motivated by racial
considerations; as Bernstein writes, "Established barbers, after all, were
interested in restricting all potential competitors, not just African
Americans."' 177 But because whites were in the majority, their preferences
came to be enacted into law, while blacks, having less political influence,
had less ability to gain the attention even of racially sensitive regulatory
agencies where they existed.
This all came to a head (so to speak) in a recent case, Cornwell v.
Hamilton.178 There, the plaintiff challenged a California law which
required her to obtain a cosmetology license in order to operate a hair
braiding shop.
JoAnne Cornwell's business, called "Sisterlocks,"
specialized in African hair braiding techniques, many of them centuries
old, which did not involve chemical treatment of the hair. Obtaining a
cosmetology license required the applicant to spend 1,600 hours and over
$5,000 at a state-approved cosmetology school before taking the test. The
hair-styling techniques taught in the school were not even useful to
Cornwell, since, as the court concluded, "African hair styling is uniquely
performed on hair that is physically different-altematively described as
tightly textured or coily hair-and that this physical difference is
genetically determined to be in close correlation with race."' 79 Further, the
licensing requirement did not protect public safety, since Cornwell was not
using the sorts of chemicals which might affect public health. Concluding
that Cornwell should not be "required to spend nine months attending a
cosmetology school, at a cost of $5,000-$7,000, learning skills, 96% of
which, they will never use,"'' 80 the court struck down the requirement on
rational basis grounds.

177.
178.
179.
180.
1277 (S.D.

Id. at 39.
80 F. Supp. 2d I101 (S.D. Cal. 1999) [hereinafter Comwell 1I].
Id. at 105.
Cornwell v. California Bd. of Barbering and Cosmetology, 962 F.Supp. 1260,
Cal. 1997) [hereinafter Cornwell 1].

2004]
B.

EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY IN THE REGULATORYAGE

SHOE SHINING

Shoe shining is another business which entrepreneurs find easy to
start. It would be hard to imagine a more harmless trade, yet shoe shining
is routinely subjected to burdensome regulations. One recent example
highlights the impact of government regulation on this business:
In Bergen County, New Jersey, the regulations for a shoe
shine stand in the lobby of the county courthouse consisted
of eighteen pages. The regulations subjected the shoe
shine operator to a competitive bidding process and a dress
code-a dark brown or burgundy, knee-length, wraparound smock with pockets. Robert Taylor, the operator at
the shoe shine stand for twelve years prior to the
regulations, wore a sleeveless apron and did not have the
required cash register or a one million dollar insurance
policy. After this silly incident (tragic to Robert Taylor)
gained notoriety in the press, the county rewrote a simpler,
less intrusive regulation.''
Regulation of shoe shining, or "boot blacking," appears to have begun
at the start of the twentieth century. 1 2 As low-skilled labor, requiring
almost no start-up costs, shoe shining was a common occupation of black
entrepreneurs in cities and thus particularly susceptible to the disparate
impacts of occupational licensing. In Brown v. Barry,'8 3 plaintiff Ego
Brown was prohibited from running his sidewalk shoe shine business in
Washington, D.C., under a law which provided that "no permit shall be
issued for a bootblack stand on public space."' 4 Brown, a successful
entrepreneur who had hired local homeless people to shine shoes, argued
85
that despite its facial neutrality, the law was vestige of the Jim Crow era
and was devised to prevent blacks from earning a living. The federal
District Court ruled in Brown's favor under the rational basis test as set

181.
Patrick Ballantine, Bringing Small Business Development to Urban
Neighborhoods,31 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 799, 801 (1996).
182.
My Westlaw search turned up no reported cases before 1900 which referred to
laws licensing or regulating shoe shining or boot blacking. Some early cases regulating
shoe shining did so in an attempt to crack down on child labor. Friedman, supra note 70, at
489 (noting that this was the period that saw the greatest growth of licensing laws). See,
e.g., Commonwealth v. Lipginski, 279 S.W. 339 (1926).
183.
710 F. Supp. 352 (D.D.C. 1989).
184.
Id. at 352-53.
185.
Id. at 353.
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forth in Cleburne. The law violated the equal protection clause, the court
held, because it treated shoe shiners differently than other vendors even
though other vendors, such as fruit stands, took up more sidewalk space
and caused more traffic congestion. 86 Acknowledging that some cases had
applied a "toothless rationality test," which "has often amounted to little
more than a rubber stamp to the legislation's purported objective,"'' 87 the
court nevertheless held that under Cleburne, government "'may not rely on
a classification whose relationship to an asserted goal is so attenuated as to
render the distinction arbitrary or irrational. ' "1 88 This principle meant that
the court must assess both "the legislation's articulated objective and the
method that the legislature employed to achieve that objective."'' 89 Inother
words, the court must apply some basic level of scrutiny to determine
whether the means chosen serve the legitimate ends pursued.' 90
C.

CASKET SALES

The funeral industry was an early convert to occupational licensing.
But licensing was only one of the ways the industry sought to increase its
prices. In 1881, American coffin makers founded the National Burial Case
Association, which set prices for the whole industry. Two years later, the
National Funeral Directors Association fixed the price of an adult coffin at
fifteen dollars, a large sum in the nineteenth century. 19' During the
twentieth century, the funeral industry became dominated by a handful of
large corporations, including Service Corporation International, Loewen,
and Stewart, which together control fifteen percent of the American funeral
industry. The national casket market is dominated by two corporations,
York and Batesville, who together share two-thirds of the American market

186.
Id. See also id. at 355 n.6.
187.
Id. at 354 (citing Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, 348 U.S. 483, 488
(1955)).
188.
Id. at 355 (quoting City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432,
446 (1985).
189.
Id.
190.
Id. ("There must be at least some plausible connection between the
'uniqueness' of a bootblack and the purpose of the law.").
191.' Once again, Mark Twain was on hand to provide the satirical response. In LIFE
ON THE MISSISSIPPI (Signet, 1980) (1883), published that same year, Twain described a
conversation with an undertaker who bragged, "'Why, just look at it. A rich man won't have
anything but your very best; and you can just pile it on, too-pile it on and sock it to him-he won't ever holler. And you take in a poor man, and if you work him right he'll bust
himself on a single lay-out." Id. at 249.
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share.9192
Nationally, the funeral industry takes in about $25 billion per
3
year. 1
The funeral industry benefits from the fact that many customers are
suffering the grief of the death of a loved one when they purchase coffins
or funeral services, which makes it easier to take advantage of a
customer.194 But the industry benefits from excluding competition as well.
Beginning in 1984, in response to new Federal Trade Commission
regulations, upstart casket retailers began offering caskets at wholesale
prices directly to the public. By "cutting out the middle man," and
specializing in the production of caskets, these retailers could offer caskets
to consumers at greatly reduced rates. The FTC prohibited funeral homes
from refusing to accept caskets from outside retailers, 195 and competition
began to decrease prices and increase choice.
For many decades, the funeral industry had special legal privileges,
which were clearly threatened by the new rules. Several states, including
Tennessee, had laws prohibiting the sale of caskets by anyone
except a
196
licensed funeral director and others passed them soon after.
Under a 1972 Tennessee law, the practice of funeral directing was
defined to include "the selling of funeral merchandise."'197 Thus, selling a
casket in Tennessee required the retailer to obtain a funeral director's
license, and that barrier to entry was set quite high. Becoming a funeral
director required a person either to attend Gupton College's twelve to
sixteen month-long funeral director program, which costs $10,000 to
$12,000, and serve a year in an apprenticeship, or to serve a two-year

192.
See Institute for Justice, The Right to Urn an Honest Living: Challenging
Tennessee's Casket Monopoly, available at http://www.ij.org/media/economicjliberty/
tennessee/background.shtml (last visited Apr. 10, 2003).
193.
id.
194.
The leading study of the funeral industry is JESSICA MITFORD, THE AMERICAN

WAY OF DEATH REVISITED 22 (1998).
195.
See 59 Fed. Reg. 1592, 1593 (1994). This regulation prohibits funeral homes
from charging "handling fees," which are simply surcharges meant to discourage customers
from purchasing outside caskets. But the regulation is routinely flouted.
196.
See Alabama (ALA. CODE § 34-13-1(a)(15)(Michie 2002); Delaware (DEL.
CODE ANN. tit.
24, § 3101(1997)); Idaho (IDAHO CODE § 54-1102 (Michie 2003)); Louisiana
(LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 37:831(23), 37:848 (West 2000); Maine (ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
32 §§ 1400(5), 1501(West 1999)); Minnesota (MINN. STAT. §§ 149A.02(19),
149A.50(l)(West 1998); Mississippi (MIss. CODE ANN. §§ 73-11-41, 73-11-51(1972));
Oklahoma (OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, § 396.3a (West 2000); South Carolina (S.C. CODE
ANN. §§ 40-19-20(19), 40-19-30 (2001); Tennessee (TENN. CODE §§ 62-5-101, 62-5-303
(1997)); Vermont (VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, §§ 1211(2), 1251(1998)); and Virginia (VA. CODE
ANN. § 54.1-2800 (2002).
197.
TENN. CODE ANN. § 62-5-101(3)(A)(ii) (1997).
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apprenticeship and assist in twenty-five funerals. Only after these
requirements were met, could the applicant take the Funeral Board
examination. 198 An application for a funeral director's license costs
$200.199 The District Court put the extremity of this burden in perspective
when 2 it noted that this law "requir[ed] two years of training to sell a
box.

,

00

Nathaniel Craigmiles, a pastor who became frustrated at seeing his
parishioners taken advantage of by funeral homes, decided to open his own
retail casket business. 20 The state soon began enforcement proceedings
against him, and he filed suit alleging that the requirement violated his right
to earn a living under the Privileges or Immunities, Due Process, and Equal
Protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.20 2
Although the Craigmiles court acknowledged that as an economic
regulation, the Tennessee statute was subject only to low-yield "rational
basis" review, 20 3 it held a full-scale trial to determine whether the law had a
rational basis. Concluding that it did not, the District Court struck down
the law. The court rejected the privileges or immunities claim, because of
the Supreme Court's evisceration of that clause in The Slaughter House
Cases, which the district court had no power to overturn-although it
acknowledged the overwhelming criticism that has been leveled at
Slaughter House.2 4 The court held for the plaintiff on the due process and
equal protection challenges. A coffin is simply a box, said the court, and
requiring retailers to go through such extensive training for licensure was
absurd.20 5 Neither Craigmiles nor his partners were officiating at the
funerals, nor were they constructing the caskets. 20 6 Although public health
concerns might justify regulating caskets construction, no public health
concern was satisfied by requiring the retailer to be licensed. There was no
evidence that leaking caskets had harmed the environment or humans, or
that caskets could be prevented from leaking.20 7 Moreover, Tennessee law
did not actually require the use of caskets in human burials at all, further

198.
Craigmiles v. Giles, I10 F. Supp. 2d 658, 660 (E.D. Tenn. 2000).
199.
See Rules of the Tennessee Board of Funeral Directors and Embalmers,
available at http://www.state.tn.us/sos/ruesO660/0660-03.pdf (last visited Apr. 18, 2003).
200.
Craigmiles, 110 F. Supp. 2d at 663.
201.
See Right to Urn An Honest Living, supra note 192.
202.
See id.
203.
See Craigmiles, 110 F. Supp. 2d 658, 662 (E.D. Tenn. 2000) (citing, inter alia,
Washington v. Glucksburg, 521 U.S. 702, 728 (1994)).
204.
See id. at 665-66.
205.
See id. at 662-63.
206.
See id. at 663.
207.
See id. at 662.

20041

EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY IN THE REGULATORYAGE

undermining the allegation that the law represented the state's attempt to
protect public health. 208 As the district court concluded,
the purpose of promoting public health and safety is not
served by requiring two years of training to sell a box ....
[N]one of the training received by licensed funeral
directors regarding caskets has anything to do with public
health or safety. The training and the exam questions
regarding caskets relate only to product information and
merchandising. These topics have no relationship to health
and safety, but might be helpful to one who sells any
product. In sum, a casket does not differ from any other
product in the marketplace. No health and safety reason
rationally relates to requiring an individual to undergo two
years of training, pay a fee, and pass a test in order to sell a
casket.2 °9
On appeal, the state argued that the district court had engaged in
"Lochnerism,"210 by substituting its own judgment for that of the
legislature, but the Court of Appeals affirmed in a brief opinion. 2 "1 After
reviewing the facts demonstrating that the Tennessee statute had little to do
with protecting consumers,2t 2 the court concluded that the state's proffered
explanations for the law were quite weak. 213 "Indeed, Tennessee's
justifications for the 1972 amendment come close to striking us with 'the
force of a five-week-old, unrefrigerated dead fish. ' - 2 14 Instead, the court
held it was absurd to see the law as anything other than "an attempt to
prevent economic competition" 2 5 and thereby to monopolize the funeral
merchandise trade in the hands of licensed funeral directors. But, the Sixth
Circuit concluded, "Courts have repeatedly recognized that protecting a

208.
Id.
209.
Craigmiles,110 F. Supp. 2d 658, 663 (E.D. Tenn. 2000).
210.
As Robert Bork explains, "to Lochnerize" is a verb derived from Lochner v.
New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), and refers to what he believes the Lochner Court did:
rewrite the Constitution to serve its own public policy determinations, rather than deferring
to the wisdom of the legislature. See ROBERT BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 44 (1990).
211.
Craigmiles v. Giles, 312 F.3d 220 (6th Cir. 2002).
212.
See id. at 222-23.
213.
See id. at 225.
214.
Id. (quoting United States v. Searan, 259 F.3d 434, 447 (6th Cir. 2001)).
215.
Id. at 225.
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discrete interest group from economic competition is not a legitimate
governmental purpose. 2 16
VI. HOW TO PROTECT THE RIGHT TO EARN A LIVING UNDER THE EQUAL
PROTECTION CLAUSE

If the decisions in Cornwell, Brown, and Craigmiles are correct, how
ought a reviewing court to approach an equal protection attack on
economic regulation? Avoiding judicial intermeddling in economic policy
is a legitimate concern, but at the same time, courts ought not to turn a
blind eye to government protections to discrete interest groups. There are
three primary lessons for reviewing courts under these decisions. First,
courts reviewing economic regulations should not cast about for
speculative justifications for the challenged law, but should address the
legitimacy of the justifications that the state actually proffers. Secondly,
the burden should be on the government to demonstrate-at least to some
minimal evidentiary standard-that the law in question does advance the
asserted objective. These requirements are consistent with a commonsense understanding of the frequently invoked phrase "rationally related to
a legitimate government purpose." The court ought to be satisfied that the
legislature had a real and legitimate purpose in mind-and that the law
adopted was somehow related to that purpose. Only such a review can
prevent pretextual assumptions of unconstitutional power. Finally, courts
must not impose on plaintiffs the logical impossibility of proving a
negative by defeating every conceivable justification for a law.
A.

AVOIDING SPECULATIVE RATIONALES

One key to applying a realistic rationality review in cases of economic
exclusion would be for courts to avoid conjuring up theoretical rationales
for challenged legislation when no reasonable and legitimate rationale 217 is
obvious on the face of the law or in the legislative history. When courts

216.
Id. at 224. Accord In re Ah Chong, 2 F. 733, 737 (C.C.D. Cal. 1880).
217.
I suggest that "reasonable" would mean: not based on the sort of irrational
prejudice, "negative attitudes" or "fear" that gave rise to the Court's concerns in Cleburne.
Cf Civil Libertiesfor Urban Believers, 2003 WL 21977001 at * 13. "Legitimate," probably
describes a narrower field for government conduct, since some things may be "reasonable,"
but not "legitimate" government purposes. It would be "reasonable," for instance, to search
a suspected criminal's home without a warrant, but it would not be "legitimate."
Nevertheless, as I have noted, supra note 78, the courts have been extremely reluctant to
define the boundaries of "legitimate government interests."
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adopt the most relaxed concept of rationality review, they frequently devise
reasons for laws which were admittedly not on the minds of those who
wrote the law. This gives the court a roving commission to devise
justifications for the law where none might exist. No court would think of
doing this in any context other than economic regulation, since, as Justice
Stevens has noted,21 8 that would obliterate the very concept of judicial
review. The rule ought to be the same throughout: fashioning justifications
in the service of judicial deference does not protect citizens. As the Court
in Barry put it, "[e]ven the minimal rational basis test does not require the
court to muse endlessly about this regulation's conceivable
objectives nor
'21 9
existence.
continued
its
for
justifications'
to 'manufacture
A law may accomplish any purpose within the boundaries of
"legitimate state interests." Those boundaries can only be set by political
philosophy. 220 But courts can find several guides in the Constitution: the
equal protection clause, the commerce clause, and other clauses which
Sunstein describes as prohibiting "naked preferences." Combined with the
political philosophy of the American founding, we must conclude that mere
protectionism is not a legitimate state interest. But if that statement is to
have any meaning-indeed, if judicial review is to have any meaning at
all-courts must look to the purpose asserted, and determine whether it
falls within the already wide boundaries of legitimate state interests. As
Steve Simpson writes, "[a]t a sufficient level of generality, any statutory
scheme can be said to serve a state purpose. But reciting a tautology is not
the same thing as examining whether a particular legislative choice is
within the bounds of its constitutional authority. It is little more than a
rationalization for government action dressed up as judicial review. ,,22 1
Drawing the boundaries is an unpalatable task for many reasons, but the
common law gives us at least some guidance: actual consumer protection is

218.
See FCC v. Beach Communications, 508 U.S. 307, 323 n.3 (1993) (Stevens, J.,
concurring)
The Court states that a legislative classification must be upheld 'if there
is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational
basis for the classification,' and that '[w]here there are "plausible
reasons" for Congress' action, "our inquiry is at an end."' In my view,
this formulation sweeps too broadly, for it is difficult to imagine a
legislative classification that could not be supported by a 'reasonably
conceivable state of facts.' Judicial review under the 'conceivable set of
facts' test is tantamount to no review at all.
Id.
219.
Brown, 710 F. Supp. at 356 (quoting Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 520
(1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
220.
See further Sandefur, "Public Use, " supra note 30, at 669-7 1.
221.
Simpson, supra note 86, at 191.
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considered a legitimate state interest. Mere economic protectionism, no
matter how disguised, is not.222 For a court to figure out which category a
particular law falls into, it must move on to the question of means chosen,
and ask whether the state has demonstrated an actual relationship between
the means and asserted ends.
B.

DEMONSTRATING ACTUAL RELATIONSHIP TO ASSERTED ENDS

The second way to protect this vital area of liberty is closely
connected with the first. Keeping government within the boundaries of
legitimate state interests is meaningless if the legislature may evade the
question by cleverly formulating its laws. 223 This point was first made by
Chief Justice Marshall. "[T]he judicial department," he wrote, must
"compar[e] the means with the proposed end, [to] decide, whether the
connection is real, or assumed as the pretext for the usurpation of powers
not belonging to the government ....,224 This ensures that the legislature
stays within its constitutional boundaries. "The judiciary may, indeed, and
must, see that what has been done is not a mere evasive pretext, under
which the . . . legislature travels out of the prescribed bounds of its
authority, and encroaches upon . . .the rights of the people. For this
purpose, it must inquire, whether the means assumed have a connection, in
the nature and fitness of things, with the end to be accomplished. 2 2 5
In holding that hair braiders did not need a cosmetology license to
practice, the court in Cornwell noted that only 65 hours of the required
course of instruction addressed issues relevant to Cornwell's business.
"These 65 hours represent only four percent of the hours required for
completion of cosmetology school. 226 Would it be rational, then, to

222.
See, e.g., The City of London's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 658, 663 (K.B. 1610):
"[T]he King may erect guildam mercatoriam, i.e., a fraternity or society or corporation of
merchants, to the end that good order and rule should be by them observed for the increase
and advancement of trade and merchandise, and not for the hindrance or diminution of it."
223.
Cf.Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 325 (1866)
The Constitution deals with substance, not shadows. Its inhibition was
levelled at the thing, not the name. It intended that the rights of the
citizen should be secure against deprivation . . . under any form,
however disguised. If the inhibition can be evaded by the form of the
enactment, its insertion in the fundamental law was a vain and futile
proceeding.
Id.
224. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 359.
225. Id. at 386.
226.
Cornwell 1,962 F. Supp. at 1273.

2004]

EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY IN THE REGULATORYAGE

require Cornwell to attend the course? If the court were to defer to the
legislature's evaluation, the answer would be yes. But the Cornwell court
avoided this absurd result: "while a perfect fit is not required ... [t]here
must be some congruity between the means employed and the stated end or
the test would be a nullity. 227 Instead, the court saw that it was irrational
to require her to take a course of education ninety-six percent of which was
useless to her.228
To take an extreme example, the state could rationally
believe that food preparers need instruction on hygiene,
sanitation and disinfection prior to being allowed to
prepare food in public schools. It would be irrational
however, to require them to go to cosmetology school,
even though they might benefit from the 65 hours related
to health, hygiene and sanitation. Ninety-six percent of the
curriculum would be irrelevant to the occupation for which
they would be seeking licensure.229
The method for evaluating the rationality of the licensing
requirements was not clear-cut. The court noted that it was "dependent on
determining the range of Plaintiffs' activities, 23 ° and then reduced the
question to a rough formula: "Assume the range of every possible hair care
act to involve tasks A through Z. Cornwell's activities would cover tasks
A, B, and some of C. The State's cosmetology program mandates
instruction in tasks B through Z. The overlap areas are B and part of C.
This minimal overlap is not sufficient to force Cornwell to attend a
cosmetology school in order to be exposed to D through Z, when she only
needs B and a portion of C.",23' Although such an evaluative method is
hardly exact, it is certainly more effective than total deference. If "rational
basis" is not to mean "anything goes," then courts must exert some basic
level of scrutiny to the law. Although the contours of that scrutiny have
never been precisely delineated, it is at least clear that it cannot mean
absolute deference to hypothetical policy rationales. If the policies adopted
are really likely to accomplish the asserted ends, then the policies are
probably instances of factions using the regulatory apparatus for their own

227.
228.
229.
230.
231.

Cornwell H, 80 F. Supp.2d at 1106.
Cornwell 1,962 F. Supp. at 1273.
Id.
Cornwell 1, 80 F. Supp.2d at 1107.
Id.at 1108.
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benefit, at the expense of the public and at the expense of potential
competitors.
C.

STOP REQUIRING PROOF OF A NEGATIVE

One especially burdensome example of occupational licensing was the
Oklahoma law struck down in New State Ice Co. v. Leibmann.23 2 The law
made it a crime to open a business to sell ice unless the owner first obtained
a certificate from the Corporation Commission attesting to a public
necessity for a new ice provider.2 33 Anyone going into the ice business was
literally required to prove that he should be free from government
regulation-that is, to prove a negative, an impossible task.234 Such a
scheme is absurd not only because it is practically impossible to meet every
conceivable objection, but because it is impossible to imagine the potential
of an economic behavior a priori: who could have predicted, a decade ago,
that a business model charging more than a dollar for a cup of coffee, and
locating on nearly street corner would become the economic powerhouse
that Starbuck's is today? Giving a "good reason" for one's choices is not
always easy, or even possible.235 Not far from my house is a coffee ship
built into an old stone building constructed in the 1850s. I find the
ambiance charming, and go there often, even though I could get coffee
cheaper elsewhere, closer to my house-indeed, I could make my own. Is
the charm a "good reason"? There is no way to answer that question, and
certainly no way to prove it to a bureaucracy. Moreover, the Oklahoma
statute pegged a business license to proof of necessity, not merely
convenience or benefit. Proving that a new business is necessary is a far
more burdensome task than to prove that the public will like the new
business, or find it preferable for reasons that even they might not be able
to state. The regulatory scheme in Leibmann required the entrepreneur to
prove (without actually doing the experiment) that his business was

232.
285 U.S. 262 (1932).
233.
See id. at 272 (quoting statute: "If the facts proved at said hearing disclose that
the facilities for the manufacture, sale and distribution of ice by some person, firm or
corporation already licensed by said Commission at said point, community or place, are
sufficient to meet the public needs therein, the said Corporation Commission may refuse and

deny the applicant [application] for said license."). HADLEY ARKES, THE RETURN OF
GEORGE SUTHERLAND 51-60 (1994) provides an excellent discussion of Leibmann.

234.
Cf.Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 22 (1973) ("to prove a negative ...[is] a
burden virtually impossible to discharge under our criminal standards of proof'); Elkins v.
U.S. 364 U.S. 206, 218 (1960) ("Since as a practical matter it is never easy to prove a
negative, it is hardly likely that conclusive factual data could ever be assembled.")
235.

See furtherVIRGINIA POSTREL, THE FUTURE AND ITS ENEMIES 89-92 (1998).
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necessary to the public. As Justice Sutherland concluded for the majority,
the imposition of this impossible burden "shut out new enterprises, and
thus create and foster monopoly in the hands of existing establishments,
against, rather than in aid of, the interest of the consuming public.

2 36

The

Court struck down the law.
That law paired an impossible burden of proof with an improper
shifting of the burden of proof: it required not only that the entrepreneur
prove the impossible, but alleviated the state of the burden of
demonstrating that its action was legitimate. In criminal law, the maxim
that a defendant is "innocent until proven guilty" reflects the logical
principle 237 that the party asserting a claim bears the onus of proving that
claim, rather than the other way. 238 In short, a person cannot prove a
negative. Yet the statute in Leibmann required a party to prove that it
ought not to be regulated, rather than requiring the state to prove that it
ought to regulate. 39 In the former situation, government may regulate
unless the individual can prove to the satisfaction of "society" that he
should be free to act. Those who defend this view argue that demands of
privacy must be "defended" against the presumption that government may

236.
Liebmann, 285 U.S. at 278.
237.
Called onus probandiincumbit actoris.
238.
See further Freeman v. Blount, 55 So. 293, 295-96 (Ala. 1911) (citing cases);
Walker v. Palmer 1854 WL 396, *4 (Ala. 1854) ("To prove this description of negative
averment, involves a moral impossibility, and is therefore not required, no matter from
which party it comes."); Davis v. Rogers 1855 WL 914, *2 (Del. Super. 1855) ("The strict
meaning of the term onus probandi is this, that if no evidence is given by the party on whom
the burden is cast, the issue must be found against him. In all cases this onus is imposed on
the party propounding the will ....)
239.
See further Sadler v. Langham, 1859 WL 738, *7 (Ala. 1859):
In some cases it is said, that the expressed will of the legislature ought
not to be disregarded, unless the unconstitutionality be clearly
demonstrated ...[or] in cases admitting of no reasonabledoubt. With
due respect, we think this language entirely too strong. It indulges, in
favor of legislative infallibility, the same strength of presumption as that
which obtains in favor of innocence when the life or liberty of the
citizen is jeoparded in the courts of criminal jurisdiction. Constitutional
provisions are intended as a protection to life, liberty and property,
against encroachment, intentional or otherwise, at the hands of the
government .... We cannot believe that construction a sound one,
which indulges every reasonable presumption against the citizen, when
the legislature deals with his rights, and gives him the benefit of every
reasonable doubt, when his life and liberty are in jeopardy before the
courts of the country.
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regulate.2 40 This places the burden of proof on the individual, but as
Anthony de Jasay writes, "[t]o falsify the hypothesis that the act is
objectionable, and therefore not one of the actor's liberties, is a needle-inthe-haystack type of task, very difficult and costly if the set of potential
objections is large, and logically possible if the set is not finite ....24 For
Richard Roe to prove that another person should not stop him from doing
an act becomes especially burdensome when the justifications for stopping
Richard are speculative. If the government adopts the principle that
"Richard should be banned from all acts which are liable to being abused,"
it becomes impossible for Richard to prove that he should be free to do
anything, since any act is potentially liable to abuse. Yet this is precisely
the burden of proof that has often been imposed on parties seeking review
of economic regulations under the rational basis test: they are required "to
negative every conceivable basis which might support [the law in
question]."242

Absurd as the regulatory scheme in Leibmann may seem in retrospect,
it is the prevailing method of economic regulation in the United States
today, particularly in the taxicab industry.243
Taxi licensing has a profound effect on the underprivileged, and
especially on unskilled, or immigrant labor, who often seek jobs driving
taxicabs. 244 A court reviewing such regulations should not impose on

See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH
240.
247 (1993). Sunstein perversely calls this view "Madisonian," even though it is precisely
the opposite of Madison's actual views. He believed that it is not the private sphere that
must justify itself in terms of the political, but rather the political sphere that must justify
itself in terms of the private. See, e.g., James Madison, Soveriegnty, (1835) in 9 WRITINGS
OF JAMES MADISON 570-571 (G. Hunt ed., 1910)
Whatever be the hypothesis of the origin of the lex majoris parties, it is
evident that it operates as a plenary substitute of the will of the majority
of the society for the will of the whole society; and that the sovereignty
of the society as vested in & exercisable by the majority, may do
anything that could be rightfully done by the unanimous concurrence of
the members; the reserved rights of individuals (of conscience for
example) in becoming partis to the original compact being beyond the
legitimate reach of sovereignty, whenever vested or however viewed.
Id.
JASAY, supra note 6, at 150. Moreover, proving that one should be free to act
241.
is itself an action which would require justification. That justification is itself an act which
would need to be justified, and that justification is another act ...and so on ad infinitum.
242.
Madden v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 88 (1940).
243.
See Jones v. Temmer, 829 F. Supp. 1226 (D. Co. 1993) vacated as moot 57
F.3d 921 (10th Cir. 1995). See also Lee A. Harris, Taxicab Economics: The Freedom to
ContractforA Ride, I GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 195 (2003).
244.
See Sandefur, Get Therefrom Here, supra note 42; WALTER E. WILLIAMS, THE
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plaintiffs the impossible burden of proving that they ought to be free, but
should instead require the government to demonstrate a rational necessity
for the regulations involved.245 Yet one recent challenge to taxicab
licensing in southern Florida failed because, as the court put it, the
plaintiffs had failed to meet "the burden 'to negative every conceivable
basis which might support [the law]."' 2 46

VII. CRITICISM OF ECONOMIC EQUAL PROTECTION

One recent law review article noted that if Lord Darcy were to return
from the dead, "he would find his state-granted monopoly on playing cards
much better received in twenty-first century America than it was in
seventeenth century England. 247 This is embarrassing, but true.
Shortly after the Sixth Circuit decided Craigmiles, a federal district
court in Oklahoma upheld a state law that, much like the law the Sixth
Circuit struck down, required sellers of caskets to have licenses as funeral
directors. 248 Powers v. Harris directly attacked the Craigmiles Court's
application of rationality review, beginning with a rejection of the Romer
and Cleburne standard of rationality review. "Because there are no
allegations of prejudice against discrete and insular groups or other
unpopular factions," wrote the court, "the somewhat exceptional equal
protection cases relied on by plaintiffs [i.e., Romer and Cleburne] ... are of
little precedential value., 249 But this was in error. The "unpopular
factions" alleging prejudice in Romer and Cleburne were the types of
factions which receive rational basis scrutiny, just like the "unpopular

75-89 (1982).
245.
It is important to note that this principle would not violate the age-old
presumption in favor of the constitutionality of statutes. That presumption holds that, when
reviewing a law, the court ought not to assume that the legislature would act
unconstitutionally, and therefore should construe the statute as constitutional if at all
STATE AGAINST BLACKS

possible. See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848 (2000). See also THOMAS COOLEY,

(1868). The
presumption of constitutionality, differs from the presumption of liberty, because the latter
presumption requires the legislature to proffer some rational and legitimate justification of
the statute, while the former means only that after such a justification has been proferred,
"[a] reasonable doubt" as to the constitutionality of that law "must be solved in favor of the
legislative action." Id. at 182.
246.
Restrepo v. Miami-Dade County 2002 WL 548821, at *6 (S.D.Fla.,2002)
A TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON THE POLICE POWERS 182-186

(quoting Beach Communications, 508 U.S. at 315).
247.
Jay Dratler, Jr., Does Lord Darcy Yet Live? The Case Against Softvare And
Business-Method Patents,43 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 823, 891 (2003)

248.
249.

Powers v. Harris, 2002 WL 32026155 (W.D. Okla. Dec 12, 2002).
Id. at *9 n.4.
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factions" challenging the Oklahoma law. Thus Romer and Cleburne ought
to have applied.
Nevertheless, the Powers court used the most lenient form of
rationality review, and did all the things which, as I have argued, turn the
rational basis test into an abdication of judicial review. The court required
the plaintiffs to prove a negative by demolishing "'every conceivable basis
which might support"' the challenged law. 250 relieved the state of any
burden to "'produce evidence to sustain the rationality of a statutory
classification, ' ,25 and invented its own speculative rationales for the law,
because "[u]nder rational basis review, it is 'constitutionally irrelevant
[what] reasoning in fact underlays the legislative decision., 252 Indeed, the
court held that "it makes no difference that the assumptions apparently
underlying the challenged legislation are 'probably not true' or even 'not
true at all."' 253 Clearly this is a carte blanche to the legislature,
masquerading as serious analysis, and which cannot withstand a fair
reading of Romer or Cleburne. Those cases, and others, 54 indicate that
courts must be on the lookout for pretextual "health and safety"
justifications of de facto discriminatory laws. As Professor Sunstein has
written, rationality review ought to at least "ensure that disparate treatment
is justified by reference to something other than an exercise of political
power by those benefitted. '' 255 But with its extreme degree of judicial
deference the Powers court went through the motions of judicial review,
without analyzing the law, or protecting the plaintiff's rights.
The Supreme Court has consistently denied that rationality review is
"an automatic shield which protects against any inquiry into the actual
purposes underlying a statutory scheme, ' 256 and held that even under
rational basis scrutiny, "we insist on knowing the relation between the
classification adopted and the object to be attained . .. [to] ensure that

250. Id. at *10 (quoting Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356,
364 (1973)).
251.
Id. (quoting Heller, 509 U.S. at 320).
252. Id. (quoting Fritz, 449 U.S. at 179).
253. Id. (quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 474 (1991)).
254. See, e.g., Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520
(1993).
255. Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV.
29, 69 (1985).
256. Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 648 (1975). See also Richard H.
Fallon, Jr., Some Confusions About Due Process, Judicial Review, and Constitutional
Remedies, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 309, 316 n.38 (1993) ("For rationality review to be real rather
than sham, the court must be willing to make some independent assessment of legislative
purpose.").
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classifications are not drawn for the purpose of disadvantaging the group
burdened by the law. 257 The Powers Court shirked this duty.
A recent law review comment on Craigmilessimilarly reveals some of
the obstacles faced by those of us who believe the equal protection clause
prohibits government from favoring some economic groups over others. 8
Brianne Gorod criticizes the court for "enshrin[ing] economic policies...
as constitutional rights. 25 9 She makes no attempt to explain how the
degree of deference she advocates would avoid causing the public-choice
problem that faced the court-in which an established economic faction
seized government power in order to protect itself from entrepreneurs. Her
appeal to democracy as a solution 260 simply begs the question, since the
Constitution protects minorities against depredations by majorities.26 1 Nor
does Gorod forthrightly abandon the notion of judicial review, which
consistency would require of her. Instead, "if the Supreme Court's use of
[Cleburne-style] rational basis review has been predicated on the Court's
heightened concern for specific groups," she writes, "its use should be
limited to those contexts., 262 Why? Gorod gives no answer, and it is far
from clear. The purpose of equal protection law is to ensure that citizens
are treated equally, not solely to redress historical racial crimes like
slavery. Indeed, some might argue that the greatest accomplishment of
twentieth century constitutional law was that equal protection jurisprudence
263
broadened beyond what previous generations thought were its limits.
The only justifications that come to mind for Gorod to distinguish between
this laudable expansion of equal protection jurisprudence on one hand, and
the use of equal protection in Craigmiles on the other, are either that she
believes politics alone enough to protect against the exploitation of

257.
Romer, 517 U.S. at 632-633. Note in particular the contrast between Powers
and Ah Chong, supra note 61. In Ah Chong, the court held that because the law was aimed
at excluding a particular group from economic competition, the law was unconstitutional
even though "the means might be [proper] if used in a proper case and for a legitimate
purpose." 2 F. at 737.
258.
Brianne J. Gorod, Does Lochner Live? The Disturbing Implications of
Craigmiles v. Giles, 21 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 537 (2003).
259.
Id. at 543.
Id.
260.
261.
See Simpson, supra note 86, at 188. "[Tlhe view that majorities are entitled to
rule without substantial restraint and that courts exceed their authority when they overrule
legislatures endures. That assumption, in any event, lies at the root of the judiciary's refusal
to engage in serious review of economic regulations. As argued in the next section, good
government is far from what has been achieved."
262.
Gorod, supra note 258, at 544.
263.
See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Reed v. Reed,
404 U.S. 71 (1971); Lawrence, 123 S.Ct. at 2484 (2003) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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economic minorities, or that she does not consider economic liberty
important. The former runs against the experience of equal protection
cases in every context, from religion to interstate commerce to freedom of
speech: added to the insights of public choice economics, this experience
leads to a practical certainty that, given the opportunity, businessmen will
use government to get rich by making it illegal to shop elsewhere. 26
"Naked preferences" violate the Constitution rather obviously in clear cases
like Yick Wo or Chaires. Legislative majorities should not be able to evade
the demands of equal protection simply by obscuring their motives or
complicating the legislative scheme more than the laws in those cases. As
to the second possibility, it seems unreasonable to ignore the importance of
economic freedom when, as Prof. Epstein has put it, "[f]reedom of contract
is an aspect of individual liberty, every bit as much as freedom of speech,
or freedom in the selection of marriage partners or in the adoption of
religious beliefs . . . . The desire to make one's own choices about
employment may be as strong as it is with respect to marriage or
participation in religious activities, and it is doubtless more pervasive than
the desire to participate in political activity. 26 5
The purpose of judicial review is (at least in part) to protect the
individual or the unpopular group against the tyranny of the majority. 266
There is no sensible reason why courts should be encouraged to offer such
protection when the right involved is the right to pray or to speak-while
refusing to offer such protection when the right involved is what Justice
William 0. Douglas called "the most precious liberty that man possesses,"
namely, the right to earn a living.267 And, as our review of the history of

264.
See Simpson, supra note 86, at 174.
265.
Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the ContractAt Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 947,
953-54 (1984).
266.
See Frank I. Michelman, Politics and Values, Or What's Really Wrong with
RationalityReview? 13 CREIGHTON L. REV. 487, 505 (1979)
[T]he Framers obviously were concerned that majoritarian legislatures
would, unless externally controlled, be too insensitive to the need for
evenhandedness . . . [and] the more we thought that majoritarian
legislators were prone to search for gains from exploitation rather than
for gains from trade, the more importance and value we should attach to
rationality review.
Id. See also Jonathan R. Macey, Public Choice: The Theory of the Firm and the Theory of
Market Exchange, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 43, 57 (1988) ("Whe[n] ...interest group oriented
statutes will be invalidated by courts ...the value of-and hence the demand for-special
interest legislation declines .... As judicial deference to legislatures goes up, as it has in
recent years, one would expect the demand for legislation by interest groups to rise as
well.").
267.
Barsky v. Bd. of Regents of the State of New York, 347 U.S. 442, 472 (1954).
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monopolies has shown, previous generations have found economic liberty
to be extraordinarily important. No legal theory calling itself "progressive"
ought to refuse protection from the types of regulatory abuses and
inequality.
CONCLUSION

In the antitrust context, the Supreme Court has noted that the
"freedom guaranteed each and every business, no matter how small, is the
freedom to compete-to assert with vigor, imagination, devotion, and
ingenuity whatever economic muscle it can muster. Implicit in such
freedom is the notion that it cannot be foreclosed with respect to one sector
of the economy because certain private citizens or groups believe that such
foreclosure might promote greater competition in a more important sector
of the economy. ' 268 This principle should also apply in the broader context
of government's own anti-competitive conduct. When we use the term
"businesses," we are talking about people-people who invest their
imagination, devotion, and ingenuity in the creation of enterprises which
they hope will provide a livelihood for themselves and their families.
When entrenched business interests, or any other factions use government
to prevent competition and protect their own profits, they engage in
precisely the behavior that the equal protection clause was meant to
prevent: preferring one group over another on some basis other than
individual merit. Courts should employ a skeptical scrutiny to the
inequalities caused or maintained by government regulation and to protect
the equal right of all Americans to pursue happiness.

See further Sandefur, Right to Earn A Living, supra note 12 at 255.
268.
United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972).

